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Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has grown very rapidly over the last decade. Demand for light 
vehicles has rapidly increased in this period, albeit from a very low base. Growing demand is 
almost entirely supplied by the import of used vehicles from the developed world. This has 
led to an enormous automotive trade deficit in the region where, apart from South Africa, 
there is almost no domestic production. The dissertation establishes the trends and scale of 
automotive demand in SSA and then considers the question of whether and how the region 
can begin to meet this booming demand by developing its own industry. Despite limited 
industrialisation levels and relatively small domestic markets, some larger countries, such as 
Nigeria and Kenya, are putting policies in place to encourage domestic production. However, 
if countries follow individual national strategies it is unlikely that any will have sufficient 
market scale or investment levels to become sustainable automotive producers.  A regional 
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Research Questions  
The automotive production is a major global industry with production occurring at multiple 
locations around the world. In the recent past this industry has undergone a fundamental 
change as production has shifted away from traditionally wealthy nations to the newly 
industrialising. One region that has largely been ignored in this shift has been Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA).  Many countries in the region are seeking to redress this and create domestic 
automotive industries. Unfortunately there is little accessible data on the automotive market 
in SSA. If countries are to establish automotive industries then this needs to be rectified. The 
level of demand, its composition and the dynamics of supply all need to be ascertained for 
appropriate policy decisions to be made. As starting an automotive industry almost certainly 
requires careful intervention, the nature of these policy frameworks will contribute greatly to 
the success or failure of the industries created. The policy options available are varied and 
already countries have started down very different routes.  
The core question of this dissertation is then whether SSA, or any of the major countries in it, 
are at present viable spaces for an automotive industry. However, the very dearth of our 
knowledge of almost any aspect of the automotive industry in the region makes this question 
impossible to answer. As such a vital prior query is: what are the current and expected levels 
of automotive demand and who currently supplies the vehicles?  However, this is not enough 
to ascertain the viability of an automotive industry in SSA since, as noted before, the specific 
policies employed are a determining factor of success. As countries have already initiated 
policy to achieve their automotive aspirations it needs first to be asked: what are these polices 
and, with a knowledge of the automotive market in these countries, how are they expected to 
perform? The second policy question which needs to be asked is: what policy if any would 
best enable SSA, or countries within the region, to become viable automotive spaces? The 
















The vast majority of this dissertation has been the product of desktop research, digging 
through journalistic and scholastic articles and interviews. There are only two sections that 
require substantive explanation in this methodology section. These are my methods for 
estimating the numbers of individuals over an income threshold in the future and the current 
automotive market size in SSA.  
Estimating Future Middle Class Population Numbers  
Seldom is reliable data available of countries’ income distributions. This data is very useful 
to poverty researchers and so significant efforts have been committed to creating 
approximations of the distribution. To this end Kemp-Benedict (2001), building on earlier 
research, finds that it is possible to build a reasonable income distribution approximation 
using population, GDP and Gini coefficient figures. Building on this Kemp-Benedict finds 
that lognormal curves best approximate a country’s income distribution.   
As such, to estimate the percentage share of the population over a certain income the 
approach of Dollar and Kraay (2002) was used. This assumes income distribution to be log 
normal, GDP per capita to be the mean of the distribution and the variance to be estimated 
using a country’s Gini coefficient. Dollar and Kraay (2002) develop a methodology for this 
type of estimation using the fundamental work on lognormal distributions by Aitchinson and 
Brown (1966) and Johnston, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1994) amongst others. If the income 
distribution is lognormal it can be shown as: 
~𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎) 
They use the logged value of a country’s GDP per capita as the mean of the log normal 
distribution (µ) and then calculate the standard deviation of the distribution using its Gini 
coefficient. Defining the Gini coefficient, on a scale of 0 to 100, as G then the standard 
deviation is given by: 




With the mean and standard deviation of the log normal distribution known, one is then able 
to calculate the percentage of the population above a certain threshold. 1 This is possible by 
using the z-table to calculate what percentile of the lognormal distribution a certain income 
level occupies. The formula for this is: 
𝑍 =  
𝑋 −  𝜇
𝜎
 
Where X is the log of the income level being searched for. Z is the Z-table value which is 
then used to find the corresponding percentile for the desired income level. To find the 
number of people living above the income threshold the percentile value is subtracted from 1 
and then multiplied by the country’s population figure. Using the process above it is then 
possible to forecast future SSA income and population levels. Using the IMF’s GDP 
predictions combined with the UN’s population estimates the GDP per capita values in 
current dollars can be estimated  up to 2020 (International Monetary Fund, 2015; United 
Nations, 2015). The Gini coefficients used for 2020 are drawn from the UNU-Wider World 
Income Inequality Database and held to be the same as their most recent, high quality 
estimate.  
                                                          
1 Many thanks to Thomas Rooney for putting up with my many questions in this regard.   
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Calculating Current SSA Market Size 
Creating an estimate of the current vehicle market in SSA is necessary due to the lack of 
accurate reliable figures. Searching through government and institutional records of car 
ownership or sales in the majority of countries in SSA yielded next to nothing. 
Unsurprisingly the numbers which are quoted for vehicle parc are almost always wild 
estimations. Estimating the total number of vehicles in countries then seemed both near 
impossible and less important that estimating vehicle flows. Estimating flows is assisted by 
the fact that there is no large scale domestic production in SSA meaning that accurate trade 
flows into the region are a good proxy for the total size of the market, as long as South 
Africa, where domestic production exists, is treated differently. For South Africa’s market I 
was instead able to use the detailed reporting of the National Association of Automobile 
Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) for the market size. For the rest of SSA trade 
data was used. Unfortunately automotive trade data from SSA countries is rife with missing 
entries or unbelievable numbers. As such rather than using import data from the countries 
themselves to track their imports mirror data from exporters was instead used.  
 
Problematically just as there are issues with SSA import data so there are issues with other 
countries export data. This is especially due to the informal nature of much of the used car 
trade, the difficulties of accounting for smuggling and the weakness of some countries’ trade 
reporting. The work of Fuse et.al (2009) assisted in vastly strengthening the estimates. They 
use multiple databases and correct for the errors using methods established by Tsigas et.al 
(1992), to estimate the global trade in used vehicles in 2005. While imports of used vehicles 
are spread quite evenly throughout the globe, exports are concentrated in a just a few 
countries (Fuse, Kosaka & Kashima, 2009: 355). The major high-income vehicle producing 
regions, the EU, US and Japan, accounted for a minimum of 85% of all used car exports in 
2005 (Fuse et. al, 2009: 355).  
 
As such I used the Eurostat Comext Database, Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau and US 
International Trade Commission datasets to form the backbone of the market estimate. All 
three also report new and used vehicle exports separately in their trade statistics allowing 
deeper analysis (Fuse, Nakajima and Yagita, 2008: 2437; Fuse et. al, 2009: 355; Schneider et 
al., 2010). However, even these datasets are still prone to the inaccuracies resulting from 
smuggling and under-valuation which occur once vehicles have entered SSA. The most 
reliable data source for imports from countries other than Japan, the US or EU is to use the 
mirror data from the UN Comtrade database and count countries exports as SSA’s imports. 2  
 
Even when UN Comtrade data is available there are some other issues. One is the possibility 
that double counting exists if the exports from non-producing SSA nations are included. This 
occurs where cars have been imported to a nation due to its good ports or low duties and then 
are counted as exports of that nation to its neighbours. As such all export from SSA to SSA 
countries, other than South African exports as it is a vehicle producer, have been dropped, 
possibly leading to an under representation of trade. There are also a few nonsensical entries 
in the UN Comtrade data, most notably; entries showing all of SACU registering impossibly 
                                                          
2 For what HS codes I used please refer to Appendix C.  
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high imports from South Africa in 2010 when South Africa changed its reporting methods.3 
These are adjusted so as to be representative of the trends in the data. A country’s market 
estimate is then the sum of exports from the EU, US and Japan, drawn from their individual 
trade data, and the sum of exports from world excluding these three groups and SSA barring 
South Africa, drawn from UN Comtrade.  
 
The two exceptions to this are South Africa and Nigeria. South Africa, as was noted earlier, 
accurately records its market size through its producer organisation and so this was used. 
Nigeria is a much more complicated case. As the magnate for most of the smuggling in West 
Africa and the largest economy in Africa the trade figures did not seem at all accurate. This 
was represented by some of the largest importers in 2013 being small countries, such as 
Benin and Togo, in its region. To get an estimate of Nigeria’s market size, and that of its 
neighbours, therefore requires an adjustment for smuggling. Golub (2012) calculates that at 
least 95% of Benin’s imports and 85% of Togo’s are re-exported legally and illegally (Golub, 
2012: 1155). The vast majority of these vehicles are destined for Nigeria so an estimate of 
85% of Benin’s imports and 75% of Togo’s heading to Nigeria was used. This percentage of 
exports destined for those countries was then instead attached to Nigeria. It was also 
estimated that 5% of Benin’s imports ultimately end up in Niger, the second largest 
















                                                          
3 It is highly unlikely that Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland each imported in (000’s) 3 212; 242; 
1785 and 985 passenger cars respectively in 2010 and then 8.9; 3.3; 15.7 and 3.1 in 2011. Especially since if 
viewed as percentages of their populations the 2010 imports represent 160% of Botswana getting cars, 12% of 
Lesotho, 82% of Namibia and 83% of Swaziland. More likely this is an error due to South Africa not reporting 
SACU members in its trade reporting until 2010. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Automotive production is a major global industry with production occurring at multiple 
locations around the world. Traditionally the industry’s major producers have been more 
technologically advanced, wealthier countries but developing countries have increasingly 
become the producers of choice. Asia in particular, has benefitted, receiving huge levels of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and a boost to industrialisation. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
however, has almost no automotive production. Whilst this may be expected because of 
historically low levels of income in SSA, a comparison with India provides for a striking 
contrast (Table 1).  
India has similar population and GDP levels to SSA but is a major vehicle producer and in 
2013 had an automotive trade surplus of $8.2 billion. In contrast, SSA has very little 
production and had a 2013 trade deficit of $16.3billion in the automotive sector. With 
demand growing rapidly in Africa, and projected to reach 10 million passenger vehicles a 
year by 2030, this raises the important question of where these vehicles will be produced. 
Will they continue to be imported or can Africa start to develop its own industry?  
Table 1: Comparison of Indian and sub-Saharan African markets, production and trade, 2013 
($ million unless otherwise stated)  
 India SSA 
 





Population (million) 1 252 937 
Per capita GDP (Current $) 1 498 1 771 
New Passenger Vehicle market (000s) 2 554 1 839*Ϯ  
Passenger Vehicle production (000s) 3 139 265 
Tariff Level for Passenger Vehicles - HS87.03   100% No Unified Tariff  
Direct Employment in Industry +1 000 000 120 000* 
 











Commercial Vehicle and Bus Imports – HS87.02 & HS 87.04  45.84 5 701.31 
Commercial Vehicle and Bus Exports – HS87.02 & HS 87.04 
 
901.61 1 341.59 
Motorcycle Imports – HS87.11  29.05  74.59 
Motorcycle Exports – HS87.11 
 
1 648.22 1.32 
Kits Imports – HS87.06 & HS87.07 120.89 241.24 




Vehicle Parts Imports – HS87.08 3 479.12 4 834.93 






Motorcycle and Bike Parts Imports – HS87.14 438.07 489.29 
Motorcycle and Bike Parts Exports – HS87.14 371.65 4.53 
Net Automotive Trade Balance +8 272.92 -16 340.2 
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Sources: World Bank Group; UN Comtrade; OICA; SIAM 
* Estimates Ϯ New and used passenger vehicles ҂ All trade figures in $ millions  
 
If SSA does not manage to produce its own vehicles, it not only misses a significant 
employment opportunity but will bear increasingly severe current account pressures as the 
trade deficit widens. However, a poorly designed automotive policy could be even worse for 
SSA as the opportunity costs of protecting and supporting the industry are high. It is 
especially problematic that investment and employment benefits of a SSA automotive 
industry would not automatically be shared evenly among the many countries in the region. 
This will encourage individual countries to initiate polices to advance their best interests, 
quite possibly at the cost of their neighbours and the region. This is already happening in 
Nigeria. How the region as a whole responds to these challenges will determine the failure or 
success of a SSA automotive industry.  
 
The second section traces the interactions of industrialisation, growth and automotive 
production in the literature. The third section analyses consumption and production in SSA, 
primarily outside of South Africa. It shows rapidly increasing demand, very little production 
and considerable interest in new investment. The fourth section outlines the aspirations of 
countries in SSA with regard to the automotive industry. A number are trying to foster 
domestic production to spur industrialisation, employment growth and improve their trade 
balance.  This is the reason for the flurry of interest in new investment. The fifth section 
tackles the question of whether SSA is actually a viable ‘automotive space’. This section 
highlights the challenges that any automotive industry establishing itself in SSA would face 
















Chapter 2: Linking the Automotive Sector to Growth  
Industrialisation and Growth  
As the global North emerged from the destruction of WWII and the global South gained 
independence it became clear that vast income differentials between the two existed. The 
great challenge for development from the 1950s onwards was how to increase incomes in the 
global South. A defining initial realisation driven by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) was 
that the value of primary commodities relative to manufactured goods had deteriorated over 
time.4 The global division of labour meant that developing countries focused on the 
production of primary commodities and were therefore doomed to permanent poverty. This 
created an understanding that the ‘structure’ of developing countries’ economies needed to be 
altered for them to be able to catch up to developed countries and not perpetuate in poverty.  
Later analysis expanded on the nature of the structural change which occurred as countries 
moved out of poverty and developed. Kuznets (1966), amongst others, identified that it was 
the movement of labour out of agriculture into manufacturing and services that was a 
hallmark of the development process. Quantitative analysis by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) 
and others confirmed that poor countries have a large share of labour in agriculture while rich 
countries do not. Van der Meer and Yamada (1990) found that labour productivity in 
agriculture is lower than labour productivity in industry and that industry productivity grows 
rapidly in developing countries. This drives the reallocation of workers from agriculture to 
industry.  
Shifting resources out of low productivity sectors into high productivity uses is then of vital 
importance to developing countries. Ajakaiye and Page (2012) describe structural change as 
often the biggest driver of economic growth in poor countries. The necessity for countries to 
undergo structural change if they are to develop is largely agreed upon. Countries cannot rely 
only on the primary sector to grow. To this end Chang (2013a) argues that even if commodity 
price shocks and declines are ignored, exploiting natural resources without industrialisation is 
unlikely to produce long-term economic development, as the primary sector is simply not 
large enough and in high productivity industries usually has poor labour absorption. Monga 
(2012) surmises: “no countries have really gone from low to high income without undergoing 
a transformation from an agrarian or resource focus to industry or services”.    
Industrialisation has shown itself to be crucial in creating structural change. In developing 
countries, industry is a relatively more productive sector than agriculture. McMillan and 
Headey (2014) add that the labour which manufacturing can absorb includes workers with 
moderate skills who receive relatively good wages. Hsieh and Klenow, (2009) find that 
within industrial production there are also opportunities for resources to move to more 
productive types of industry and even within these industrial activities firms differ in 
productivity levels. Even if producing exactly the same product Soderbom (2012) finds that 
larger firms operate completely differently to smaller firms in developing countries. There are 
large gains in output per worker which occur as production methods change for the same 
product.  Additionally manufacturing firms in developing countries are able to imitate 
technologies and practices of frontier firms. Rodrik (2013) found that this phenomenon has 
led to an unconditional global convergence of labour productivity in manufacturing, while 
                                                          
4 That this was a long run historical trend has been confirmed by more recent authors, such as Harvey, Kellard, 
Madsen and Wohar (2010) who confirm the trend over four centuries.  
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economy wide convergence does not occur. A further implication of industry is that it allows 
for the diversification and sophistication of production, a characteristic that many studies 
have linked to faster growth and higher incomes (Imbs & Wacziarg, 2003; Cadot, Carrere & 
Strauss-Kahn, 2011; Hausmann, Hwang & Rodrik, 2007; UNIDO, 2009).  Industry then is 
vitally important to create structural change and growth.  
What is the State’s role?  
There is growing consensus amongst academics that market forces alone are not enough to 
initiate industrialisation and structural change, the state has a vital role to play (Page, 2011; 
Kaplinsky & Morris, 2014; Morris, Kaplinsky & Kaplan, 2012; Chang, 2013a, 2013b; 
Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012; Lin & Monga, 2011; Monga, 2012; Lin & Chang, 2009; Cimoli, 
Dosi & Stiglitz, 2009; Greenwald & Stiglitz, 2006). To what extent the state should be 
involved in driving structural change and in what manner have been sharply contested by 
different schools of thought. The area where much of this debate has centred is industrial 
policy, which Aryeetey and Moyo (2012) define as: “the actions of the government in re-
allocating resources to support industrial development”. Industrial policy has experienced 
varying levels of support over time (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012). In the 1960s and 1970s 
industrial policy had support from arguments that it could be used to resolve pervasive 
market failures. In the 1980s it lost its appeal as evidence of governmental failure grew and 
neo-classical economics rose to prominence. However, by the late 1990s the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ had been unable to create growth and Asia had experience rapid growth using 
industrial policy, returning it to relevance.  
Industrial policy has continued to be debated. In trying to end the questions of its legitimacy 
Chang (2011) argues that industrial policy has been used by all successfully industrialised 
countries during phases of growth, as well as many developing countries when they were 
experiencing relatively higher growth rates. Chang (2011) posits that industrial policy is quite 
possibly a “necessary, although not sufficient, condition for economic development”.  Slowly 
a consensus of industrial policy’s necessity and legitimacy is being reached with even neo-
classical economists accepting industrial policy (Lin & Chang, 2009)5. The debate has then 
gradually transformed into a discussion of what role and form industrial policy should take 
when a country attempts to use it to effect structural change and growth (Page, 2011; Monga, 
2012; Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012). 
The clearest difference in opinion as to the role of industrial policy is well developed in the 
debate between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang (2009). The core of the difference of opinion 
is whether industrial policy should be ‘comparative-advantage-enabling’ or ‘comparative-
advantage-defying’ as Lin describes it. Lin and others believe that industrial policy has a role 
in countering market failures and allowing a country’s optimal industrial structure to emerge, 
in line with its comparative advantage. The surplus that is then generated allows the rapid 
accumulation of human and physical capital which slowly alters the country’s endowments 
and hence comparative advantage. In contrast if industry which deviates from a country’s 
comparative advantage is encouraged then there are high costs of protection and the industry 
cannot quickly become internationally competitive. This means it struggles to generate a 
surplus and alter endowments or ever mature.  
                                                          
5 This was a debate between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang facilitated by the Development Policy Review and 
later published in the journal.   
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In contrast, Chang argues that it is vital for a country to defy its comparative advantage for 
industry to upgrade. Chang’s views are clear in a 2011 paper where he defines industrial 
policy as: “policy that deliberately favours particular industries over others, against market 
signals, usually (but not necessarily) to enhance efficiency and promote productivity growth”. 
In Lin and Chang (2009) he argues that accumulating capital and technological capabilities in 
an industry does not automatically lead to industrial upgrading, as capabilities and capital are 
industry and even process specific. Crucially, technological capabilities are mostly 
accumulated through production, making it impossible for a developing country to develop 
capabilities in an industry without defying its comparative advantage at that time and entering 
it. It is also impossible to know how fast technological capabilities, and international 
competitiveness, in an industry will be acquired until that industry has actually been entered.  
In Lin and Chang (2009), Chang does warn that comparative advantage should not be ignored 
as it can provide an indicator of the cost of entering a new industry. The further the industry 
is away from comparative advantage the larger the costs of protecting it. If the deviation is 
too large then the costs of protection could well outweigh any advances in productivity. In 
essence there is a lot of uncertainty and risk involved in industrial policy but it is sometimes 
necessary to use it to defy comparative advantage, hopefully increasing productivity and 
fostering growth.       
The protection of industries that Lin and Chang (2009) and others discuss often relies on 
restricting free trade. Krugman envisages in his 1987 paper that while there are scenarios 
where governments restricting trade is in their national interest, there are also a myriad of 
challenges in implementing this. Using trade policy as a first best policy response can often 
have unintended negative impacts and political economy concerns. Free trade is then a good 
rule of thumb. A number of authors agree, arguing that even if it is theoretically appropriate 
industrial policy is often very difficult to implement (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012; Monga, 2012; 
Page, 2012). A government needs specialist knowledge and high levels of bureaucratic 
competence when intervening in a sector or industry directly, as in trade policy. It is vital for 
countries to only aim to design industrial policies for which they have the bureaucratic 
capacity to implement successfully (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012; Monga, 2012; Page, 2012).     
Structural Change and SSA  
Despite recent growth Africa has achieved only limited structural change. Monga (2012) 
finds that export diversification, manufacturing’s contributions to GDP and employment have 
all either not improved or actually gotten worse in the last 40 years for Africa. Morris and 
Fessehaie (2014) support this, finding that Africa’s recent growth has been driven by primary 
commodity exports. Additionally the growth that has occurred has not brought with it 
sufficient job creation or social progress. Page (2011) adds that both the diversity and 
sophistication of products produced in Africa has decreased over time. Similarly Morris and 
Fessehaie (2014) report a lack of diversification in products exported.  
How this reality has interacted with structural change in Africa in the recent past is examined 
by McMillan, Rodrik and Verduzco-Gallo (2014). Surprisingly they find that structural 
change has actually had a growth retarding effect. This phenomenon has occurred since 
workers and capital have moved from more productive to less productive sectors in Africa 
from 1990-2005. Globalisation and the exposure to competition that it heralded raised the 
productivity levels of African industry, but in this process workers were shed who returned to 
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lower productivity activities. This negative effect actually accounts for much of the 
difference between Africa and Asia’s respective economic performances from 1990-2005. 
However, McMillan et al. (2014) also found that structural change was starting to have a 
positive effect post 2000 in Africa, as manufacturing slowly starts to grow.  
It is a widely held belief that industry needs to be revitalised and grown as rapidly as possible 
in Africa, to generate positive structural change and growth (Page, 2011; Ajakaiye & Page, 
2012; Chang, 2013; McMillan et al., 2014; Morris & Fessehaie, 2014). The exact approach to 
achieve this and what industries Africa should focus on is less agreed upon. A number of 
authors hold that Africa must focus on its comparative advantage and develop manufacturing 
that reflects this (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2013; Lin & Monga, 2011; Monga, 2012; Page, 2012). 
What industry is thought to best suit Africa’s comparative advantage differs. Aryeetey and 
Moyo (2012) advocate agro-industry as a key starting point, as does Page (2011). Monga 
(2012) suggests adopting a ‘flying geese’ approach with the aim to foster industries which 
countries that have experienced fast growth from similar endowments had 20 years ago. This 
will hopefully attract the transfer of capital and technological capabilities from these 
countries, as their endowments and hence comparative advantage has shifted out of the 
targeted industries, encouraging firms to relocate production. Morris and Fessehaie (2014) 
argue that it is by developing backward and forward linkages with the commodities sector 
that Africa will reap the greatest returns for employment and growth.  
Automotive Industries and Industrialisation  
The automotive industry has long been an industry that countries have sought to promote as 
part of their industrialisation strategies. Lall (1980) argues that an automotive industry is 
viewed as a vital component of the ‘modern industrial economy’ due to its linkage intensive 
nature. This can stimulate growth in other sectors of the economy, in essence acting as a 
catalyst for industrialisation, which can in turn drive structural change and growth. As such, 
the creation of an automotive industry was a mainstay of post-colonial developing countries’ 
industrial policy, including in SSA. These strategies were part of larger import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) policies. Lall (1980) finds that the automotive industries created under 
ISI industrial policy regimes largely failed, other than a few which managed to transition to 
become more competitive and export orientated. It is argued by Aryeetey and Moyo (2012) 
that the ISI supported industries of post-independence SSA failed as they were too far from 
countries’ comparative advantage. Governments did not have sufficient bureaucratic 
capabilities to successfully implement the dynamic polices needed for industries to so defy 
comparative advantage. 
The failures under ISI have not dampened developing countries desires to use industrial and 
trade policy to create domestic automotive industries. Nag, Banerjee and Chatterjee (2007) 
observe that countries' motivations are unchanged with the automotive industry still viewed 
as a catalyst for wide scale industrialisation. This is unsurprising given that the linkage 
intensive nature of the automotive industry is also unchanged. Lettice, Wyatt and Evans 
(2010) observe that three times as many people are employed in industries supplying parts to 
vehicle manufactures than by the manufacturers themselves. An additional factor 
encouraging developing countries to promote the automotive industry, highlighted by Nag et 
al. (2007), is the opportunity to benefit from firms relocating their vehicle production to 
lower cost developing countries. It is also encouraging to developing countries that the 
automotive industry is an industry which now developed countries, such as Korea and Japan, 
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were able to successfully develop in defiance of their comparative advantages at the time of 
establishment, as Chang describes in Lin and Chang (2009).    
Unfortunately while some developing countries have succeeded in establishing automotive 
industries in defiance of their comparative advantage, many others’ attempts have faltered 
and been costly failures or else never managed to reach their desired potential. Even if a 
country has all the indications of the potential to create an automotive industry getting the 
industrial policy right is a challenge. This is made even more difficult by the problematic 
political economy of a highly protected and symbolic industry, which attracts rent seekers 
and prestige policies. Aswicahyono (2000), Hale (2001) and Wad (2009) find that in 
developing countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, national car projects are particularly 
susceptible to these risks, performing poorly and succumbing to rent seeking.  
That the automotive industry is linkage intensive is certainly a boon for industrialisation if 
true automotive manufacturing occurs. However, if countries are unable to move past 
assembly and cannot attract component producers then they are left with a costly, protected, 
inefficient industry with a net negative effect on the broader economy. In this vein 
Aswicahyono terms the Indonesian industry pre-rationalisation in 2000 “an old baby” which 
refuses to grow up. Fortunately for Indonesia a regional financial crisis and resulting regional 
policy changes forced the baby to grow up after 70 years. Sarwar et al. (2010) find an even 
worse result for Pakistan which has a floundering automotive industry with no prospect of 
change, some of which is immensely inefficient, publicly owned and a source of large public 
sector losses.      
Requirements to Develop an Automotive Industry 
When seeking to establish an automotive industry, successful developing countries have 
focused on assembly and manufacture. Design of vehicles is even further from a developing 
countries comparative advantage than production and so is seldom justifiable as part of an 
initial industrial strategy. When countries do try to embark on design it is often costly and 
unsuccessful (Wad, 2009; Hale, 2001).The norm for developing countries wishing to 
establish an automotive industry is to focus on attracting investment in localised production 
from established automotive producers, who already have the technological capabilities in 
design. Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1998) find that firms generally only relocate manufacturing 
capabilities outside of the ‘Triad’6 regions, where they enjoy efficient production, when they 
are faced with either trade barriers or difficulties in their domestic car production spaces, 
such as rising wages.  
When trade restrictions are the motivation most firms invest so as to capture rents from high 
effective rates of protection, using very low investment plants to assemble surplus production 
from other manufacturing locations. Investment will usually only be increased if the producer 
is pressured to increase production in the developing country by its industrial policy. If this 
happens whether the producer increases its investment levels or exits the market is 
conditional on there being significant potential in the developing country’s domestic market. 
If there is potential then trusted, captive, suppliers are usually encouraged to invest alongside 
the vehicle producer, transplanting the production network of the producer’s home nation. 
Alternatively when firms are seeking to take advantage of international wage differentials 
                                                          
6 The Triad are the developed automotive regions of Western Europe, Japan and the US.  
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more substantial investment occurs from the outset, with the aim of exporting production into 
markets which the firm currently supplies from its higher cost production sites. Sturgeon, 
Van Biesebroeck and Gereffi (2008), agree that cost factors ae a major driver for location 
decisions. They argue that since the 1980s there has been an intensifying approach where 
firms locate production in the lowest cost production locations within a region for that 
regional market. These firms demand that their largest suppliers also have an international 
presences.  
What is universally agreed is that the viability of automotive assembly and production is very 
scale dependent. This is because in the automotive industry, total costs rise less than 
proportionally to output when the scale of production is increased. Black (2007) suggests 
there are three major reasons for this. More efficient methods of production and machinery 
are used in large scale production, including increased automation. There are enormous initial 
investments required for design and establishing production of a product with additional 
tooling costs for any later model changes, high volumes are able to lower the per unit cost of 
these investments. Labour and management are able to specialise further with larger scales of 
production.  
For efficient production, firms need to produce at or above minimum efficient scale, which is 
the lowest level of production which exhausts all available economies of scale. Alcorta 
(1998) examines the impact of economies of scale and scope on production. Product scale 
determines the duration of a production run in that product, with longer runs requiring less 
frequent change overs to produce different parts. Economies of scope are found in automotive 
manufacturing. These exist where the production of multiple products together is less 
expensive than the sum of producing them individually. This can create multi-product 
economies of scale, where individual products may not benefit from large production runs but 
large total volumes can be obtained by producing multiple products.  
What production level is of minimum efficient scale is not agreed upon, whether advances in 
flexible production practices have managed to lower these levels is a central theme of 
disagreement (D’Costa, 2004; Karmokolias, 1990; Jenkins, 1995; Abrenica, 1998; Sturgeon 
& Florida, 1999). Rhys (2004) finds that despite advances in management and production 
processes minimum efficient scale for assembly has remained at 250 000 vehicles a year. 
Black (2007) argues that flexible manufacturing has rather than lowering plant level 
minimum efficient scale instead allowed for a greater differentiation of models to be 
produced within a plant. This is supported by D’Costa (2004) who finds that flexible 
manufacturing practices do not reduce production levels, but rather that large production 
volumes are a necessary precondition for effective implementation of flexible manufacturing 
in a developing country.  
One way to estimate minimum efficient scale is to refer to plant production levels in open 
markets.  Sturgeon and Florida (1999) do just this and find that plants in a multinational 
vehicle producer’s home country assemble on average 230 000 vehicles a year. In line with 
Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1998) they found that when a firm located production in a 
developing country for the purpose of exporting into existing markets production was still 
substantial, with 159 000 vehicles assembled a year on average. This suggests that minimum 
efficient scale of around 150 000 vehicles per annum can be achieved in low-cost labour 
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environments.  However, production in developing countries for domestic consumption was 
on average 44 000 vehicles a year, well below minimum efficient scale.  
Minimum efficient scales differ between automotive assembly and the various components 
used in automotive production. Karmokolias (1990), Black (2007) and Rhys (2004) all argue 
that as components often have extremely high costs to establish production they require 
larger production runs to meet a minimum efficient scale than is the case with assembly. Each 
component has its own minimum efficient scale and even within parts they may have their 
own constituent components with different scales. For example, engine block casting, 
machining and engine assembly all have different efficient scales. Rhys (2004) suggests that 
through using common platforms, where multiple models share 65% of the same costs, 
developing countries are more able to consolidate demand for high minimum efficient scale 
components across multiple plants.  
Black (2007) argues that as fixed costs are higher, diseconomies created by low volume 
assembly are much larger for component producers than for assemblers. When examining 
firm motivation Karmokolias (1990) found that plants that assembled imported completely-
knocked down (CKD) kits of 40 000 vehicles or more a year allowed low enough unit costs 
for profitability in protected markets. This means that when protected by tariffs on vehicle 
imports, assemblers are comfortable establishing plants which operate far below the 
minimum efficient scale of production. The diseconomies mean component producers will 
require their own set of industrial policies if they are to be attracted, as they will not simply 
follow protected assembly.    
Process of Establishing an Automotive Industry in a Developing Country 
Creating an automotive industry in defiance of a country’s comparative advantage and 
technological capabilities is a challenge which has always required industrial policy support. 
The process of developing an automotive industry is unique in each country which attempts 
it, but there can be some common stages of development. There are also cases where 
countries have managed to transition directly to world class manufacturing and skipped any 
number of stages. The various stages of development that do exist are agreed upon by a 
number of authors (Karmokolias, 1990; Jenkins, 1995; Abrenica, 1998; Ruigrok and Van 
Tulder, 1998; Natsuda & Thoburn, 2011).  
The first step usually takes the form of restricting imports of fully built up (FBU) vehicles, 
through tariffs or a ban, while encouraging the establishment of local assembly plants, at the 
cost of the consumer. In aberrant situations where a country is a particularly unattractive 
investment opportunity, usually due to a very small domestic market, but still imposes 
protection semi-knocked down SKD kits may be imported for assembly. Ruigrok and van 
Tulder (1998) note that SKD kits in their most extreme form are vehicles which are produced 
to completion, disassembled and then exported to the developing country for reassembly in a 
‘screwdriver’ plant. Almost no value added occurs and the plants exist so as to avoid tariffs, 
often enjoying enormous effective rates of protection.  
Any country which protects its domestic market and allows SKD imports needs to ensure that 
this is not a lasting situation as it brings none of the benefits of an actual automotive industry. 
There is no accumulation of technological capabilities, no linkage driven manufacturing 
growth, FDI is limited and the industry unsustainable without protection. Production of SKD 
kits occurs at a location where vehicles are produced efficiently and the viability of SKD 
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assembly is determined by a country’s protection levels not the scale of assembly. The 
processes of assembly differ between SKD and CKD assembly so SKD assembly at large 
scales is neither necessary nor sufficient to initiate the transition to CKD. However, it could 
act as an indicator that there is a large enough domestic market that the investments required 
for CKD assembly are justified.  
Allowing firms to start with SKD assembly may be used to encourage firms to invest in a 
country where an information failure would lead them to not commit to a higher level of 
investment and so shun a market with legitimate prospects. However, for this to be justifiable 
once the viability of the market has been shown firms must be required to ramp up 
investments and transition into CKD assembly. CKD assembly requires significant scales of 
production and investment to be economically viable. This makes a decently sized domestic 
market a prerequisite for attracting the necessary investment.  
Abrenica (1998) stresses the need for wise local content rules so as to encourage domestic 
content without excessively raising costs in CKD assembly. This is important as components 
are where linkages are created. Local content rules were historically enforced through 
requiring that a percentage by value or weight of vehicles must be locally made. Alternatively 
targeted tariffs can be used to encourage domestic production of specific parts. Localisation 
policies typically initially focus on the less technical or more difficult to transport parts, such 
as wiring harnesses, batteries and radiators where domestic firms are more able to compete. 
As time passes so domestic manufacturing capabilities can increase through the technological 
capabilities gained from production as well as human and physical capital accumulated in the 
industry. This shifts the developing country’s comparative advantage.  
Abrenica (1998) suggests that an industry will make the transition from kit assembly to actual 
production when it becomes more economic to produce higher value-added components in 
the developing country than to import them.  For this to occur, assembly needs to be of a 
large enough scale that component manufacturers can benefit from economies of scale. 
Karmokolias (1990) suggests that an investment and skill intensive process such as localised 
engine production is viable with annual production runs of 250 000 vehicles using the same 
engine. This will only happen if a country’s automotive industry undergoes a rationalisation 
of the number of makes and models of vehicles they assemble concentrating in a few high 
volume models.  
A rationalisation of an automotive industry is necessary to deal with coordination failure 
between assemblers and component producers. Black (2007) maintains that industrial policy 
is then required and justified to initiate it. There are multiple possible policy options open to 
developing countries trying to rationalise their automotive industry. The first option is simply 
to rapidly liberalise and remove protection from the industry. In response firms would have to 
be able to produce at global levels of efficiency or shut down, forcing successful firms to 
increase scale. However, this policy only would work if the comparative advantage shift 
generated from the CKD assembly phase has also produced assemblers capable of being 
globally competitive. They would require extensive investment to increase scale and firms 
would need to be convinced that the future of the developing country industry is worth that 
investment. Otherwise firms will simply exit the unprotected industry.   
The second policy option Black (2007) reviews are stringent local content policies. If these 
are increased over time they can drive the rationalisation of an assembly industry if the 
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domestic market is large enough. This is because localisation policies, if correctly designed, 
can mean that the diseconomies created by assembling vehicles at low volumes are borne by 
the assemblers, not the component producers. This then incentivises assemblers to assist 
component producers to develop capabilities to produce at minimum efficient scale. This 
echoes Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1998) when they argue that a large protected domestic 
market will make automotive producers encourage captive component producers to transplant 
their production to the developing country, if it is cost effective. The component producers 
will only invest if they are confident that the assemblers will also increase their capacity.  
Black (2007) warns that high local content requirements in a small market will incentivise 
assembly firms to increase their production runs rather than production levels. Essentially 
since the domestic market is not large enough for increased production volumes if 
investments are to be recouped the same models are produced for longer time periods. The 
impact of this is a domestic market supplied with dated vehicles at high prices. These factors 
also remove any real possibility of exports and continued growth in the industry.  
A third policy option, outlined by Black (2007) which was popular with developing 
countries, is trade balancing. This required producers to at least partially balance their trade, 
with the aim of promoting exports. This encourages firms to invest in efficient production if 
they still wish to access the domestic market. It is attractive because firms were able to 
specialise in production of a single type of vehicle at minimum efficient scale and then export 
the surplus from the domestic market, while using imports to provide consumers with variety. 
A common mechanism was to allow exporters to offset duties on imports. 
Black (2007) notes that none of the three policies directly address rationalisation and the 
coordination problem that needs to be solved. It may instead be better to have industrial 
policy that encourages a rationalised industry to emerge from inception rather than once it is 
already established. Limiting the number of firms or more directly the number of makes and 
models assembled in a country is a way to do this and can be coupled with production targets. 
If the domestic market is also protected then high volumes can be assured from an early 
stage, at the cost of consumer choice.  
Once rationalisation has successfully occurred and if wage competitiveness continues, an 
automotive industry initially aimed at a domestic market can be globally competitive and 
may no longer require much protection (Abrenica, 1998; Jenkins, 1995). If an industry 
reaches a globally competitive level then exports should be able to provide the volumes 
needed for growth. The continued accumulation of capital, human and physical, and 
increased technological capabilities in the industry can also result in a competitive advantage 
over other production locations boosting export prospects. Alternatively production costs 
may rise and exports flag, threatening the sustainability of the industry. Not all countries 
follow this exact route, some do not ever drop import restrictions even once globally 
competitive or may never reach global competitiveness remain reliant on subsidies.         
Considerations for supporting an automotive industry 
Forecasting Domestic Demand 
Protection is a vital component of establishing an automotive industry. Importantly Melitz 
(2005) argues that policy makers need to be sure that protection will generate higher 
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cumulative benefits than costs. Whether this is possible will depend to a large degree on 
factors that the developing country will only know about once it has actually entered the 
industry, such as whether it can be cost competitive. One factor that can be known, to a 
degree, before entering the industry is domestic vehicle demand and how it is projected to 
change. Throughout the process of developing an industry the absolute size of domestic 
demand informs both the decisions of firms and policy makers. Vehicle demand is 
determined by the rates of vehicle ownership in a country, which in turn are almost entirely 
dependent on income levels, with the majority of vehicle ownership forecasting relying on 
this relationship (Button, Ngoe & Hine, 1993; Dargay & Gately, 1999; Dargay, 2002; de Jong 
et al., 2004; Clark, 2007; Dargay, Gately & Sommer, 2007; Chamon, Mauro & Okawa, 
2008).  
O’Brien (1992) found that industry forecasters in the 1990s viewed vehicle demand as 
rapidly increasing when per capita income reached the $2 000 to $2 500 range. Button, Ngoe 
and Hine (1993) modelled the ownership of vehicles in 58 developing countries.7 They found 
that in the lowest income countries vehicle stock was inelastic to income but in the slightly 
wealthier nations it was highly elastic, suggesting an income threshold over which demand 
increased. Storchmann (2005) developed the income threshold concept to include not only 
the income differences between countries but also within them. Storchmann (2005) found 
that in poorer countries an unequal income distribution means a portion of the population are 
able to reach the threshold for vehicle ownership more quickly than average per capita 
incomes suggest, whereas in a wealthy country inequality excludes a group from being able 
to purchase vehicles.  
For developing countries the concentration of income is then a key factor in allowing 
individuals to access motor vehicles. Storchmann’s work was used by Chamon, Mauro and 
Okawa (2008) to estimate the threshold level of income in developing countries. They found 
that the threshold for households to own vehicles is a per capita income level of around $5 
0008, the percentage vehicle ownership amongst households when per capita income is over 
this income level is radically higher than below it. The impact of income distributions means 
that in the case of large developing countries with relatively unequal income distributions, 
such as China, enormous demand will occur while the national per capita incomes are far 
below the threshold. This in turn means that more unequal countries where the per capita 
income is below the vehicle purchasing threshold will also exhibit higher per capita vehicle 
ownership rates than those that have more equal income distributions.      
Cost of Protection 
There are also social costs when a country restricts the free trade of vehicles.  The costs 
resulting from restricted FBU vehicle imports are two fold, consumers not only have to 
purchase more expensive locally assembled new vehicles, but it also blocks their access to 
the global surplus of used FBU vehicles. These used vehicles flow out of developed countries 
and into developing country markets where they depreciate more slowly. Low cost used 
vehicles are able to create widespread social benefits by improving access to transportation, 
often in countries where alternatives are expensive or inefficient.  
                                                          
7 These are countries with per capita incomes less than $3000 in 1986 (Button, Ngoe & Hine, 1993: 53). 
8 Constant 2000 dollars 
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Grubel (1980) identifies why developing nation households have higher willingness to pay 
for low quality vehicles than households in the developed world. There are four key reasons: 
lower labour costs in developing countries mean labour intensive repairs are less costly; 
lower levels of human capital mean a lower opportunity cost from breakdowns; lower 
incomes means lower demand for luxury and the combined factors mean a smaller depressive 
effect of new models on older model prices as advances in durability are not as prized. 
Gavazza, Lizzeri and Roketski (2014) find that the level of trade is determined by the degree 
of heterogeneity of willingness-to-pay and transaction costs. They also find that developed 
countries often use measures in their own countries to stimulate new vehicle purchases. The 
measures create transaction costs in developed countries’ domestic used vehicle markets, 
making exports more attractive.  
Pelletiere and Reinert (2004) use a gravity analysis of the global vehicle trade to show that 
FBU vehicle imports can be easily controlled by policy. They find that measures to restrict 
FBU vehicle imports drive up transaction costs and so limit used vehicle imports more 
severely than more expensive new vehicles. Clerides (2003) shows that used vehicle import 
restrictions have a substantial negative effect on consumer welfare by raising the price of 
vehicles, which also shrinks the market for vehicles. Clerides (2003) also finds that when 
restrictions on imports are relaxed, governmental income often increases, since although 
tariff levels may drop increased volumes of imports and registrations create a net positive 
impact on the fiscus.  As such the protection of an automotive industry comes with a heavy 



















Chapter 3: Sub-Saharan African Automotive Space  
There is little accessible data on the automotive market in SSA. If countries are to establish 
automotive industries then this needs to be rectified. The level of demand, its composition 
and how it is supplied all need to be ascertained for appropriate policy decisions to be made.  
Demographics  
Changes in SSA for 2000-2013 
SSA is changing. According to World Bank figures, since 2000 SSA has averaged a GDP 
growth rate of just below 5% (World Bank, 2015). While this growth is from an 
exceptionally low base it has meant that SSA’s GDP has grown from just $362 billion in 
2000 to a not unsubstantial $1.65 trillion in 20139 (World Bank, 2015). Per capita incomes 
have also vastly increased from $545 in 2013 to $1 760 in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). While 
this is impressive SSA remains by far the poorest region in the world. The 2013 GDP per 
capita for the second poorest region, developing nations in North Africa and the Middle East, 
is a substantially larger $4 693 (World Bank, 2015).  
SSA is also undergoing rapid population growth. Africa has the fastest growing population of 
any  major global region with its population  growing at an average 2.55% per annum 
between 2010 and 2015 (United Nations, 2015). SSA seems to being growing even faster, 
averaging 2.68% annual growth between 2000 and 2013 with an increasing trend (World 
Bank, 2015). This has meant that SSA’s population has expanded from 664 million in 2000 
to 937 million in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). Urbanisation is out pacing population growth 
with an average annual rate of just over 4%, which has meant that the percentage of the 
population that is urbanised grew from 31% in 2000 to 37% in 2013 (World Bank, 2015).  
The population is also very young, children under 15 accounted for 41% of the population in 
2015 and another 19% are between 15 and 24 (United Nations, 2015: 7). The young 
population could lead to a demographic dividend where the percentage of the population of 
working age grows creating a high working population to dependant population ratio (United 
Nations, 2015: 7). However, this is reliant on the working age population actually being 
employed and SSA historically has had high youth unemployment rates, if not demographics 
will instead contribute to instability and social costs (United Nations, 2015: 7).    
Projections into the Future 
While SSA has been growing economically, in population and urbanising for around a decade 
and a half now, what of the future? With regards to economic growth all major organisations 
predict rapid growth to continue, despite the recent commodity price slump. The IMF World 
Economic Outlook predicted 5.1% GDP growth for SSA in 2016 which should grow to 5.4% 
by 2020 (International Monetary Fund, 2015: 170). This makes SSA second only to 
developing Asia in predicted growth and SSA nations feature prominently amongst the fastest 
growing nations in all IMF forecasts (International Monetary Fund, 2015).  The World Bank 
is slightly more pessimistic, predicting 4.6% growth in 2016, and 5% in 2017 (World Bank 
                                                          
9 The GDP figures are calculated using the current exchange rates for SSA, as exchange rates have also 
strengthened real growth is smaller than suggested by GDP figures.    
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Group, 2015). However, the trend is again an increasing one and only bettered by the two 
regions of South Asia and East Asia and Pacific (World Bank Group, 2015).  
Population is expected to explode over the next decades. The UN predicts that Africa will 
account for over half of all population growth between 2015 and 2050 (United Nations, 
2015). While UN figures are not perfect, specifically in some countries with poor reporting, 
they are still the best estimates available on population forecasting in the region.10 Africa is 
predicted to have a population of 1.68 billion by 2030 and by 2050 will account for 25% of 
global population with 2.48 billion inhabitants, assuming decreasing fertility rates on the 
continent (United Nations, 2015: 3).  
Between 2015 and 2100 28 African nations are expected to more than double their 
populations, amongst the 28 are 10 SSA nations which are projected to experience five-fold 
increases (United Nations, 2015: 4). Nigeria is expected to become the third most populous 
country  in the world by 2050 with a population of 399 million people, by 2030 it is still 
expected to have nearly doubled its population to 263 million (United Nations, 2015:21). By 
2030 there will be three SSA nations with populations over 100 million and 21 with 
populations over 20 million, Eastern and Western Africa will both have populations of over 
half a billion (United Nations, 2015:21). In 2050 there will be six countries with populations 
of nearly 100 million or more, and a total population of 1.12 billion between them (United 
Nations, 2015:21). 
Table 2: Top 10 Most Populous SSA Countries according to UN Estimates  
 Population in millions 
                        2015                    2030 
Nigeria 182 263 
Ethiopia 99 138 
DRC 77 120 
Tanzania 53 83 
Kenya 46 65 
Uganda 39 62 
South Africa 54 60 
Mozambique 28 41 
Angola 25 39 
Ghana 27 37 
Source: UN Population Division 2015 
In the longer term East Africa looks set to overtake West Africa as the fastest growing region 
of SSA while Southern Africa will continue to lag because of lower growth rates in South 
Africa (African Development Bank Group, 2011). Overall then SSA is set to continue to 
experience growth with some regions growing much faster than others. Consumer spending 
and the middle class are expected to continue to grow and at a much higher rate than per 
capita incomes (Deloitte, 2014). Household final consumption expenditure increased by 
10.7% per annum in the 2000-2012 period and by 2030 over half a billion Africans are 
estimated to be middle class (Deloitte, 2014: 2).11 
                                                          
10 The UN figures for Nigeria are disputed in The Economist. Revenue distributions in Nigeria and voting power 
in central government are determined by a region’s population, incentivising census rigging towards larger 
numbers. Additionally the data on fertility rates used for UN estimates is dated and possibly now inaccurate as 
fertility rates are expected to have declined (The Economist, 2015).  
11 This estimate is based on middle class status being attained at a relatively low income level.   
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Countries with higher levels of inequality experience more rapid growth in automotive 
demand (Storchmann, 2005). This is because when the per capita income level is well below 
the threshold for vehicle ownership and a society is unequal more individuals are able to pass 
the threshold when incomes increase (Storchmann, 2005: 36) SSA’s level of inequality is 
then important for projections of automotive demand. While Gini coefficients are well known 
for being difficult to measure they offer the best measure of inequality which is available 
(Chamon et al., 2008). Using the highest quality Gini figures available for the 2000-2011 
period SSA has a simple average Gini of 44.412,  which indicates intermediate levels of 
inequality (UNU-WIDER, 2014).13 It seems unlikely that inequality will be radically reduced 
in SSA soon.  Demand for vehicles generally grows faster than per capita incomes, as a small 
increase in income can push a significant percentage of the population over the threshold of 
affording vehicle ownership. As income distribution in SSA is relatively unequal, demand 
will grow especially quickly. 
Using the information above it is then possible to forecast future SSA income and population 
levels. Using the IMF’s GDP predictions combined with the UN’s population estimates 
allows GDP per capita values in current dollars to be estimated  up to 2020 (International 
Monetary Fund, 2015; United Nations, 2015). The Gini coefficients used for 2020 are 
conservatively held to be the same as their most recent, reliable reading. Using these values 
the percentage share of the population over a certain income can then be estimated using the 
approach of Dollar and Kraay (2002). This assumes income distribution to be log normal, 
GDP per capita is the mean of the distribution and the variance can be estimated using a 
country’s Gini coefficient.14 The forecast can then be used to estimate how much of the 
population will pass over the threshold income for vehicle ownership. Chamon et al.’s (2008) 
view is that at over a per capita income of $5 000 per capita a significant number of 
households start owning vehicles.15 This does not suggest that anywhere close to every 
individual over the income level will own vehicles, but that a significant portion of the 
households they form will do so.   
Applying the forecast, 272.1 million people are predicted to have a yearly income over $5 
000 in SSA in 2020 (Table 4). This is a very significant 33.5% increase in just five years, 
from the current not unsubstantial 203.8 million which is reached using the same method. 
West Africa dwarfs the rest of the region primarily due to Nigeria having 85 million people 
earning beyond the threshold. Nigeria is then expected to shift 15 million people over the 
threshold in five years, this is 22% of the total of all people in SSA to cross the threshold in 
that period. Even at double the threshold, $10 000 where car ownership is usually ubiquitous 
at the household level, Nigeria is predicted to have 57.8 million individuals in 2020. As the 
threshold applies to households it is not implied that all these 272.1 million people will own 
vehicles. However, it does suggest that given observed trends a significant number of SSA 
households will have a vehicle in 2020. With this in mind, SSA’s automotive demand could 
well reach significant levels in the near future.      
                                                          
12 Not accounting for country size. 
13 The Gini coefficient data is drawn from the UNU-Wider World Income Inequality Database. This database 
uses primary and secondary sources to give a Gini coefficient variable for all countries. It also details the quality 
of and the methodology used to generate each Gini value.  
14 A detailed description of the methodology can be found in the Methodology section.  
15 In Chamon et al. (2008) they find that approximately 30% of household in China at the $5 000 level own cars 
and 75% in India.  
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Table 3: Estimated Top 10 Middle Class Populations 
 
Population earning over $5 000 per annum (millions) 
                     2015                   2020 
Nigeria 70 85 
South Africa 28.6 31.4 
Kenya 12.2 17.4 
Angola 9.1 15.4 
DRC 9 13.9 
Tanzania 6.9 10.4 
Ghana 6.5 8.9 
Cote d’Ivoire 5.8 8.2 
Ethiopia 4.1 7.8 
Uganda 5.4 7.4 
SSA Total 203.8 272.1 
Source: IMF 2015; UN Population Division 2015; Author’s calculations 
The Current Automotive Market in SSA 
While the general growth trends in SSA are positive, what of the automotive market? 
Searching for reliable figures of car ownership or sales in the majority of countries in SSA is 
a formidable challenge. The accessibility, reliability and form of registration data varies 
significantly across SSA. Accurate estimates of the vehicle parc are also limited. For 
instance, WardsAuto cites total registrations for 2013 of 9.3 million and 1.4 million vehicles 
respectively in South Africa and Nigeria (WardsAuto, 2014). The South African figures are 
accurate but the Nigerian figures represent a major under-estimate.16   
 
It is then prudent to not attempt to estimate vehicle stocks, but rather the annual flows of 
vehicles. A lack of large scale domestic production in SSA means that accurate trade flows 
into the region are a good proxy for the total size of the market, as long as South Africa, 
where domestic production exists, is treated differently. South Africa’s market is known 
through detailed reporting by the producer federation in the country, the National Association 
of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA). Therefore, in calculating total 
SSA market size, South Africa’s imports are not used, but rather the official statistics on 
market size provided by NAAMSA.  
 
To track the flows of used cars is still a significant challenge. One complication is that 
generalised customs coding does not require vehicles to be classed as new or used. It is up to 
a country’s customs agencies to require the classification and not all do so (Fuse, Kosaka & 
Kashima, 2009: 349). Classifications of what constitute a roadworthy vehicle and its value 
are also not uniform. For example, one country’s export-barred end-of-life vehicle (ELV) 
may be classified as a functioning vehicle by another (Schneider et al., 2010). Even between 
countries with the same standards there is invoice manipulation and freight fees are not 
applied in the same manner, sometimes passenger vehicles are recorded at “free on board” 
values and at other times “cost, insurance and freight” value (Fuse et al., 2009: 349; Brooks, 
2012). This means that the value of exports given by a country is almost always vastly 
different to the value ascribed to the exports by the importing country.   
                                                          
16 Nigeria has now overtaken South Africa as the largest economy on the continent and it is implausible that its 
vehicle parc would only be 15% the size of South Africa’s. The author’s estimates are that annual light vehicle 
sales in Nigeria amount to 738 442 vehicles per annum and that even conservatively the vehicle parc is over 5 




In addition to these administrative issues, there is also widespread smuggling and grey 
importing in SSA. Vehicle smuggling is by no means unique to SSA and is endemic in the 
trade, even in regions with much tighter control on their borders. It occurs on a massive scale 
inside the EU (Brooks, 2012; Beuving, 2004; Golub, 2012; Fadahunsi & Rosa, 2002; 
Schneider et al., 2010). It often is also quite ingenious and notoriously difficult to tackle, oft 
cited examples of this are Russian sailors who carried cars as cargo on their return journeys 
from delivering timber to Japan, and members of the Pakistani diaspora who sent used cars 
back to Pakistan and avoided a used car import ban (Fuse et al., 2009: 349; Brooks, 2012: 83; 
Fuse, Nakajima & Yagita, 2008: 2437).  
 
Unrecorded flows mean that even trade statistics are not fully capable of accounting for the 
used car trade. Nor can they account for the flow of new passenger vehicles particularly 
accurately in SSA as flows include unaccounted parallel ‘grey’ imports. This is where surplus 
passenger vehicles from dealers outside the region are moved into SSA, often despite 
regulations against their trade. According to interviews with industry experts the scale of this 
trade in SSA is unknown but significant.  Even the producer organisations are only able to 
give estimates for the numbers of new passenger cars they are supplying to almost all of SSA 
(OICA, 2014).  
 
The lack of concrete figures leads to countries having multiple competing estimates of 
vehicle markets and parc. An example of this mixed message effect is Nigeria. A 
governmental source claimed in 2011 that demand for passenger vehicles was 75 000 new 
and 100 000 used passenger vehicles a year (Jalal, 2011). In that same year the very same 
government source said in a different forum that that the numbers were in fact 80 000 new 
and 200 000 used per annum (Opara, 2011). Three years later industry sources claim 500 000 
cars were imported in 2014, of which 40 000 or 50 000 were new, depending on which 
industry representative you are asking (Cockayne, 2014; OICA, 2014). This is disputed by 
port operators who in 2014 stated that Nigeria imports 800 000 vehicles a year with less than 
80 000 of these being new (Airahuobhor, 2014). The variety of figures creates a confusing 
and inconsistent picture, and suggests that figures are being manipulated for the benefit of 
whichever interest group is promulgating them.  
Historical Trends in Vehicle Supply 
The newly independent governments of SSA embraced automotive industries under import 
substitution policies as a route to development. This meant that by the 1970s automotive 
assembly industries had appeared in South Africa, Zaire, Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, 
Madagascar, Angola, Tanzania and Zambia (Lall, 1980: 793).  In a region long mired in 
poverty, capturing the welfare gains associated with the free trade in vehicles, as described by 
Grubel (1980) and quantified by Cleridies (2003), trumped industry protection in the eyes of 
global institutions. As such under SSA’s ‘structural adjustment’ programmes of the 1980s 
these industries had their protection stripped away and the sector was opened rapidly to free 
trade. Almost all automotive industries in SSA could not compete with the enormous flows of 
low cost, used vehicles that came to dominate domestic markets and so shut down (Pelletiere 




The passenger vehicles which began to flood into SSA from the late 1980s onwards are 
sourced mainly from developed countries. In many of these countries, policies exist to 
encourage vehicle scrapping and generate new vehicle purchases. The most famous of these 
is the Japanese ‘shaken’ policy, where a car requires a costly examination after three years in 
order for it to be allowed to remain on the road (Clerides, 2008: 324). Many owners instead 
opt to purchase a new car rather than paying for the inspection (Clerides, 2008: 324). 
Boosting domestic motor vehicle production is not the only motivation for scrappage 
policies. In the EU, Canada and the US there have been policies to encourage consumers to 
replace old cars with newer less polluting new cars (Schiraldi, 2011: 287). This partnered 
with limited domestic demand for older models means that relatively good quality used 
vehicles flow to the developing world at low prices.   
 
Poor quality used vehicles also contribute to the flow of vehicles into the developing world. 
The European Union, Japan and Korea all have strict rules governing the disposal of ELVs to 
limit environmental damage and dumping (Sakai et al., 2014). The safe dumping process is 
complex and costly, meaning the recycled materials extracted from the process seldom cover 
the costs of their removal and the safe disposal of the unrecyclable materials (Schneider et al., 
2010: 39). A more profitable exercise for many is to illegally dump ELVs by exporting them 
to SSA and other developing regions (Fuse, Nakajima & Yagita, 2008; Schneider et al., 2010: 
8 & 39; Sakai et al., 2014: 3). Older vehicles from developed countries are often then 
eventually exported as very low cost, low quality vehicles when they are no longer 
roadworthy in the original market.    
 
SSA is best viewed as having de facto regional markets rather than individual national 
markets. This is because of the fluidity of many country’s borders, due to endemic smuggling 
(Fadahunsi & Rosa, 2002; Golub, 2012). Importers bring used cars into the region through 
countries which have the lowest tariffs, shipping costs or where there are no strict age limits 
on used car imports (Beuving, 2004: 512; Brooks, 2012: 83). After entry the cars are then 
transported on to their actual sale destinations, which may involve the legal or illegal crossing 
of national borders (Fadahunsi & Rosa, 2002: 414 & 415; Brooks, 2012: 85). Bribes to 
customs officials and smuggling mean that large amounts of invoicing are either incorrect or 
missing, making accurate trade statistics a challenge. However, most cars are imported into 
the general region of their final destination nation, even if they are initially delivered into 
another country (Beuving, 2006a; Brooks, 2012).  
 
The three general regions for imports are: Western, Eastern and Southern Africa. Each has 
developed their own networks of used and new car trade, which are closely linked to which 
side of the road they drive on (Pelletiere & Reinert, 2006, 2010). In West Africa where all 
countries are left-hand drive (Figure 1) imports are predominantly from the left-hand drive 
countries of Western Europe and to a lesser extent the United States (US) (Beuving, 2006b). 
Imports are channelled through the major ports of Cotonou in Benin, Lome in Togo and 
Lagos in Nigeria (Beuving, 2004: 511–512, 2006a: 5).   
 
In Southern Africa, Durban in South Africa is the main port used to supply the region, along 
with Walvis Bay in Namibia (Brooks, 2012, p.83; Kaira, 2014). However, South Africa has 
banned used cars being driven through it destined for other countries and Botswana has done 
the same, requiring them instead to be transported on trucks which is more costly (Kaira, 
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2014). As a result, some Southern African countries are shifting to East African supply routes 
(News Day, 2014). The imports for Southern Africa, predominantly right-hand drive nations, 
are sourced directly from Japan and to a lesser degree the Middle East (Brooks, 2012; Lester 
2015) 
 
The East African car trade has been comparatively less investigated by researchers. It appears 
East Africa also mainly relies on flows from Japan and the Middle East, possibly with the 
Middle East having a larger role than in Southern Africa (Sander, 2004; UN Comtrade, 
2015). Imports from the Middle East are most probably re-exports from right-hand drive 
Japan as the Middle East is predominantly left-hand drive. Unfortunately how passenger 
vehicles are channelled through East Africa has not been thoroughly researched. 
Interestingly, in 2005 Fuse et al (2009) estimate that Uganda accounted for 1% of global used 
car exports in 2005 (Fuse, Kosaka & Kashima, 2009: 355). More recent trade statistics also 
rank Uganda as one of the larger SSA vehicle exporters, with exports predominantly flowing 
to its neighbours (DESA/UNSD, 2015). Uganda has 0% tariffs on used vehicle imports, 
which is lower than most of its neighbours, possibly making it an attractive export destination 
for tariff dodging regional re-exporters (UNCTAD, 2015). Research into smuggling in the 
region has focused on vehicle parts rather than vehicles themselves but shows Uganda to be a 
hub in that traffic, especially in moving goods to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and South Sudan (Ackello-ogutu, 1996; UBOS, 2012).      
 
Figure 1: Left-Hand and Right-Hand Drive Countries  
 
Source: Benjamin D. Esham 2007 
*Red indicates left-hand drive and blue right-hand drive.  
 
The flow of used cars into SSA is largely informal with two major types of traders involved 
in facilitating their import and sale. Trading used vehicles is capital intensive and so members 
of trader families generally pool resources, operating as a unit (Beuving, 2006a; Brooks, 
2012: 83). From immigrant communities in SSA there have emerged families who have are 
able to import large numbers of vehicles for resale (Brooks, 2012: 83). These traders often 
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have established connections with used car exporters in the developed world, having traded in 
their home countries before moving to SSA (Brooks, 2012: 83). In some cases these groups 
have been able to amass political power and wealth and capture more valuable nodes in the 
trade of used cars. The most successful of these are Pakistani families who arrange logistics 
for cars out of Durban and Lebanese families controlling the shipping of vehicles into West 
Africa (Beuving, 2006a: 84; Brooks, 2012: 86).  
 
The other group of used vehicle traders are locals from SSA who arrange for the import of 
cars from one of the used car export hubs to their home market. These traders also often make 
use of familial networks. Commonly family members are sent to live in diaspora 
communities at vehicle export hubs, they then select cars to send back to be sold by other 
family members in their country of origin (Beuving, 2004, 2006a: 84–86). While some of 
these traders are also able to import substantial numbers of cars, it is not limited to large scale 
operators with even students studying abroad regularly sending a few cars a year home for 
their family to sell (Fadahunsi and Rosa, 2002: 413; Beuving, 2004: 524, 2006b). This group 
does not typically control the more profitable nodes of the trade outside of SSA, but may do 
so within SSA. In Benin for instance, a Yoruba17 cartel controls the majority of the used car 
markets and claim a percentage of all sales, a more profitable position than selling the cars 
themselves (Beuving, 2006a: 33).     
 
The networks of smuggling and corruption in the used car trade are entrenched and contribute 
significant wealth to those involved (Benjamin and Mbaye Aly, 2012).18 In West Africa the 
majority of smuggling is used to move cars into Nigeria from Benin and Togo where import 
costs are lower and regulations looser (Fadahunsi and Rosa, 2002; Beuving, 2006a; Golub, 
2012). Fadahunsi and Rosa (2002) note that smuggling is so common in the region that on 
Benin’s border, workshops for producing forged Nigerian license plates and registration 
documents operate openly (Fadahunsi and Rosa, 2002: 421). In parts of Southern Africa, 
systems of high tariffs and duties encourage corrupt border officials to give used cars below 
market valuations, and thus lower duties (Brooks, 2012: 86). In Mozambique an attempt to 
challenge this system led to the murder of the government official spearheading the 
investigation (Brooks, 2012: 87).  
Establishing a Market Estimate 
The informal nature of much of the used car trade, the difficulties of accounting for 
smuggling and weakness of some countries’ trade reporting all create significant barriers to 
estimating the size of the light vehicle market in SSA. Some clarity was provided by Fuse 
et.al (2009). They use multiple databases and correct for the errors using methods established 
by Tsigas et.al (1992), to estimate the global trade in used vehicles in 2005. This approach 
was able to yield possibly the most accurate account of the global trade in used vehicles. 
While imports of used vehicles are spread quite evenly throughout the globe, exports are 
concentrated in a just a few countries (Fuse, Kosaka & Kashima, 2009: 355). The major high-
income vehicle producing regions, the EU, US and Japan, accounted for a minimum of 85% 
                                                          
17 The Yoruba are an ethnic group who are present in both south-western Nigeria and southern Benin.   
18 Some estimates place the used car trade, with its illegal elements included, as contributing around 10% of 
Benin’s GDP (Benjamin & Mbaye Aly, 2012: 202–204).  
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of all used car exports in 2005 (Fuse et. al, 2009: 355). All three report new and used vehicle 
exports separately in their trade statistics and have taken active steps, since the early 2000s, 
to counter grey areas of trade (Fuse, Nakajima and Yagita, 2008: 2437; Fuse et. al, 2009: 355; 
Schneider et al., 2010). 
 
The Eurostat Comext Database, Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau and US International 
Trade Commission datasets are then able to give the best account of global used vehicle 
flows. However, even these datasets are still prone to the inaccuracies resulting from 
smuggling and under-valuation which occur once vehicles have entered SSA.  As such it is 
best to still view SSA at the regional level and trade statistics on a quantity not value basis. 
The most reliable data source for imports from countries other than Japan, the US or EU is to 
use the mirror data from the UN Comtrade database and count their exports as SSA’s 
imports. While the UN Comtrade dataset is not perfect19 it does allow for a general picture of 
the annual market for passenger vehicles in SSA to be established. Its greatest explanatory 
power is in identifying the general trends in the data.  
 
Light Vehicle Market Estimate for SSA 
  
The types of light vehicles for personal use are passenger vehicles and light commercial 
vehicles (LCVs).20 Of the two, passenger vehicles are a much bigger market in SSA and have 
clearer associated reporting. LCVs for personal use are more difficult to isolate in trade 
statistics, since a LCV with purely commercial applications, such as a small refrigerated van, 
is indistinguishable from any other LCV in its weight class, such as a pickup. While LCVs 
are currently portrayed as the vehicle of choice in SSA consumer surveys and industry 
interviews suggest that this is not actually the case. It is rather comfortable, safe and 
exclusive passenger vehicles that are desired and compact passenger vehicles that are 
purchased (Narteh et al., 2012; Sedzro et al., 2014; Lester, 2015).  As such while LCV market 
estimates are given, in-depth analysis focuses on passenger vehicles.   
 
An initial estimate suggests very rapid growth in vehicle demand in SSA. In the 10 year 
2003-2013 period, the light vehicle market in SSA grew at a compound annual rate of 10.9% 
and in SSA excluding South Africa grew at 14.1%. Growth was slowed by the 2008-2009 
financial crisis but has recovered quickly and seems to be returning to its pre-crisis levels. 
Excluding South Africa, in the three year period of 2003-2006 annual growth was 22.7% and 
for the three years of 2010-2013 it was marginally lower at 19.7%. The LCV market outside 
of South Africa was growing at 8% per annum for the 2003-2013 period, compared to 15.1% 
per annum for passenger vehicles. The slower growth rate from a smaller base market has led 
to LCVs losing ground to passenger vehicles. In 2003 LCVs accounted for 19% of the non-
South African light vehicle market in SSA and in 2013 this had dropped to 11%.    
 
Table 4: Approximate Market for New and Used Passenger Vehicles & Light Trucks (000’s) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* 
                                                          
19 For an explanation of the issues with UN Comtrade data see Appendix C.  







Vehicles   
587 
 
707 883 1 066 1 259 1 186 1 124 1 124 1 464 1 654 1 839 
 Light 
Trucks  
187 200 258 388 431 361 341 257 296 331 341 
Total  773 908 1141 1454 1690 1547 1465 1381 1760 1984 2180 





Vehicles   
339 406 463 584 825 856 866 787 1 068 1 214 1 388 
 Light 
Trucks  
79.3 67.7 87.8 188.2 226.5 191.8 223.3 123.6 146.7 174.5 172 
 Total 419 474 551 773 1051 1048 1089 910 1214 1388 1561 
             
Source: UN Comtrade; Eurostat Comext Database; Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau; US International Trade 
Commission; Central Statistics Office Botswana and OICA 
*South Africa only started to report its BLNS exports post 2010, for methodology description see Appendix B.  
 
The fact that some of the largest importers in 2013 were small countries, such as Benin and 
Togo, supports the finding that vehicle smuggling is widespread. Benin, imported 330 868 
passenger vehicles in 2013 making it the third largest SSA importer and placing it far above 
countries of comparable population and income. To get an estimate of a country’s market size 
then requires an adjustment for smuggling. Golub (2012) calculates that at least 95% of 
Benin’s imports and 85% of Togo’s are re-exported legally and illegally (Golub, 2012: 1155). 
The vast majority of these vehicles are destined for Nigeria, with the alternate smuggling 
destinations of Niger, Mali and Burkino Faso consuming the rest. Using these statistics a 
viable estimate of the Nigerian market can be crafted by adding 85% of Benin’s imports and 
75% of Togo’s to Nigeria own imports. That 85% and 75% of Benin and Togo’s imports 
respectively end up in Nigeria may well be an underestimate as these numbers do not include 
completely unrecorded smuggled vehicles (Beuving, 2004; Assamoi & Liousse, 2010; Golub, 
2012). It is estimated that 5% of Benin’s imports ultimately end up in Niger, the second 
largest destination for smuggling and re-exporting. South Africa’s import figures are of little 
assistance for market estimation, since it is both a producer and importer. As such South 
Africa’s market is known from the official sales figures rather than import data.  
 
The major exporters of passenger vehicles to SSA are as the literature suggests, with the EU, 
US and Japan accounting for on average 73.3% of exports over the 2003-2013 period. India 
has risen spectacularly as a source of cars for SSA. Exports to SSA grew at a compound 
annual rate of 50.4% between 2003 and 2013 resulting in total growth of 5901% over the 
period. India now accounts for 13.6% of all SSA imports, mostly to South Africa and 
Nigeria.   
 
Table 5: Top 10 New and Used SSA Passenger Vehicle & LCV Estimated Markets, 2013 
Passenger Cars LCVs 
Nation Market Estimate Nation Market Estimate 
Nigeria 706 619 South Africa 169 262 
South Africa 450 440 Nigeria 31 823 
Ghana 92 135 Namibia 15 068 
Kenya 62 751 Kenya 14 845 
Niger 51 124 Ghana 12 932 
Tanzania 36 191 Mozambique 9 072 
Angola 33 156 Angola 8 758 
Botswana 31 122 Zambia 7 833 
Cameroon 30 622 Zimbabwe 6 876 
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Guinea 29 219 Uganda 6 404 
Source: UN Comtrade, Eurostat Comext Database, Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau and US International 
Trade Commission; OICA.  
 
LCV demand is dominated by the South African market which accounted for on average 
51.8% of the SSA market for LCVs in the 2003-2013 period. In South Africa LCVs account 
for 27% of the new light vehicle market and in Nigeria a tiny 4% of the total light vehicle 
market. Crucially, even used LCV imports are expensive and so compete with similarly 
priced new or very high quality used vehicles. These vehicles are often more attractive than 
LCVs to the urban middle class who are the majority of purchasers. LCVs are unpopular in 
the EU and Japan, which have the most established used vehicle export links to SSA. This 
restricts the supply of relatively cheaper LCVs to the region. South Africa is the largest 
exporter of LCVs into SSA as it is a production hub for a number of OEMs’ LCV models. 
The other large exporters mostly sell used LCVs, for example 83% of Japan’s 2013 LCV 
exports were for used vehicles.  
 
Table 6: Top 10 New and Used Passenger Vehicle & LCV Exporters to SSA, 2013 
Passenger Cars LCVs 
 Number Exported  Number Exported 
EU 764 848 South Africa 62 249 
US 248 906 EU 60 251 
Japan 248 030 Japan 50 449 
India 242 135 Brazil 17 578 
Korea, Rep. 71 305 China 12 176 
Switzerland 47 712 India 8 952 
Canada 36 688 Thailand 7 667 
South Africa 32 593 Korea, Rep 7 069 
Australia 26 564 Switzerland 6 256 
Thailand 16 150 Argentina 4 055 
Source: UN Comtrade, Eurostat Comext Database, Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau and US International 
Trade Commission 
 
The regional21 market is dominated by West Africa, driven by Nigeria and Southern Africa 
where South Africa accounts for the lion’s share of the light vehicle market. East Africa as a 
whole accounts for less vehicles than are imported directly to Nigeria and Central Africa in 
turn imports around the same number as Kenya. 
 
Table 7: SSA Passenger Vehicle Markets, 2013 
Region Total Market* Percentage Shares Shares (Excluding South 
Africa) 
West Africa 989 199 53.8% 71.2% 
Southern Africa 611 364 33.2% 11.6% 
East Africa 172 772 9.4% 12.4% 
Central Africa 65 754 3.6% 4.7% 
Source: UN Comtrade, Eurostat Comext Database, Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau and US International 
Trade Commission 
*Includes all new and used passenger vehicles  
                                                          
21 Countries are divided into their regions using the African Development Bank’s classifications; see Appendix 




West African passenger vehicle imports drive EU and US exports into SSA. West Africa 
accounted for over 85% of the EU’s used passenger vehicle exports and 95% of the US’s in 
2013. US used passenger vehicle exports have grown at a rapid compound annual rate of 
41.2% per annum for the 2003-2013 period. Southern and Eastern Africa dominate Japan’s 
used passenger vehicle exports to SSA, accounting for 48.1% and 43.2% respectively in 
2013, with just six countries accounting for 81.1% of all imports. These countries, from 
largest to smallest importer, are: Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Mozambique. As South Africa does not permit the import of used vehicles its inflows are all 
for re-export. These trends are as expected with right-hand drive countries exporting to right-
hand drive regions and left-hand drive to left-hand drive.  
 
Motorcycle Imports into SSA 
 
Table 8: Total Imports of New and Used Motorcycles (000s) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
SSA 1 238 1 428 1 788 2 052 2 578 3 199 2 347 2 708 4 099 3 250 3 849 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
 
Table 9: Top 10 New and Used SSA Motorcycle Importers, 2013 
 Number of Imported Motorcycles 
Nigeria 1 370 177 
Togo 474 237 
Angola 343 102 
Guinea 240 475 
Kenya 173 147 
Mali 161 277 
Tanzania 158 775 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 120 017 
Ghana 104 164 
Benin 99 531 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
As there is some domestic production of motorcycles imports are not as strong a proxy for 
market size as light vehicle imports, but they do give an indication of demand. Motorcycle 
imports unsurprisingly suggest that there is a much larger market for motorcycles in SSA 
than for light vehicles. Again Togo and Benin import too many motorcycles for countries of 
their population and income, again suggesting that imported motorcycles are shipped across 
their borders, primarily to Nigeria. This is evidenced by the fact that Cote d’Ivoire, another 
coastal West African country, both more populous and with a higher GDP per capita than 
either Togo or Benin imported only 38 383 motorcycles in 2013 and Cameroon which is 
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more populous and wealthier still imported 61 181.22 It is reasonable then that imports for the 
domestic markets in Benin and Togo can be generously estimated as 50 000 motorcycles a 
year with most of the imports above that level smuggled into Nigeria. If this is the case then 
Nigerian imports are in the region of 1.75 million motorcycles a year. Only five countries 
have domestic markets that are larger than Nigeria’s imports alone, namely: India, China, 
Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand (King, 2013). This suggests the potential to grow domestic 
production significantly.     
 
Over 95% of motorcycles shipped to SSA come from either China or India, with China 
representing 70% of total imports. Japanese exports are a distant third and 75% of these are 
used bikes, mostly destined for Nigeria. China’s large scale exports to SSA are due to it 
having widespread market penetration in the region, it manages to export over 50 000 
motorcycles a year to no less than 13 SSA countries. India by contrast concentrates its 
exports in a few countries. Over 50% of India’s total exports are destined for Nigeria and 
India only exports over 50 000 motorcycles a year to three other SSA countries. It is only in 
East Africa that India approaches the kind of market penetration that China has continent 
wide. However, India’s second biggest export destination, Kenya, still imports more 
motorcycles from China.   
 
Table 10: Top 10 New and Used Motorcycle Exporters to SSA 2013 
 Number of Imported Motorcycles 
China 2 806 479 
India 883 133 
Japan 63 224 
Taiwan 27 423 
Thailand 26 947 
EU 22 992 
Indonesia 7 093 
United States 2 727 
Vietnam 2 594 
Singapore 2 216 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
Table 11: Top 10 SSA Motorcycle Importers from China and India in 2013 
China India 
Nigeria 810 603 Nigeria 510 206 
Togo 448 080 Uganda 82 792 
Angola 278 866 Kenya 70 081 
Guinea 197 583 Angola 56 517 
Mali 158 517 Guinea 41 995 
Tanzania 127 439 Tanzania 30 164 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 107 118 Sierra Leone 12 341 
Kenya 101 890 Congo, Dem. Rep. 10 715 
Benin 96 976 Ethiopia 10 596 
Mozambique 91 602 Congo, Rep. 10 351 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
                                                          
22 The 2014 GDP per capita for Togo, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon respectively were: $646, $825, $1 
646 and $1 426 (World Bank, 2015). The 2014 populations for Togo, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon 
respectively were: 7, 10.6, 20.8 and 22.8 million (World Bank, 2015).    
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Motorcycles imported into SSA, almost all are of the small ‘workhorse’ variety with 99% of 
imports having below 250cc engine capacity.   
Table 12: Breakdown of Motorcycle Types Exported to SSA 2013 
Type Percentage of total Imports 
Under 50cc 4.85% 
Over 50cc and under 250cc 94.17% 
Over 250cc and under 500cc 0.13% 
Over 500cc and under 800cc 0.14% 
Over 800cc 0.17% 
Other 0.53% 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
New Light Vehicle Market Estimate SSA 
 
The general flows of light vehicles and motorcycles into SSA show the huge growth in 
demand for low cost private modes of transport. However, these flows do not give any insight 
into how SSA’s growth has affected demand for more expensive new light vehicles, which 
are the vehicles that any domestic industry would produce. As the US, EU and Japan account 
for almost 75% of total imports they can give a fairly powerful insight into the trends in the 
proportionality of used and new passenger vehicle imports within total imports.  
 
Table 13: New and Used Passenger Vehicle Exports from the EU, US and Japan to SSA 
Year 
Total Exports to SSA Exports  to SSA Excluding South Africa 
Used New Ratio  
(Used : New) 
Used New Ratio (Used : New) 
2003 224 170 143 271 1.6:1 194 249 54 993 3.5:1 
2004 301 547 185 975 1.6:1 268 030 53 516 5.0:1 
2005 305 113 232 371 1.3:1 272 751 53 172 5.1:1 
2006 344 730 291 437 1.2:1 315 677 79 644 4.0:1 
2007 528 891 297 263 1.8:1 498 972 97 042 5.1:1 
2008 557 842 221 094 2.5:1 524 420 87 064 6.0:1 
2009 559 818 141 688 4.0:1 513 146 51 027 10.1:1 
2010 621 531 198 985 3.1:1 566 668 58 074 9.8:1 
2011 781 824 206 282 3.8:1 714 335 58 160 12.3:1 
2012 983446 212 641 4.6:1 935 233 59 883 15.6:1 
2013 1 027 927 233 857 4.4:1 977 505 64 496 15.2:1 
Source: Eurostat Comext Database, Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau and US International Trade 
Commission 
 
New passenger vehicle exports to SSA from Japan, the EU and US have been growing at a 
much slower rate than their exports of used passenger vehicles, with a compound annual 
growth rate of 5.2% for new versus 17.2% for used cars in the 2003-2013 period. South 
Africa accounts for both the largest quantities and fastest growth in new passenger vehicle 
imports from Japan, the EU and US. Without South Africa, it seems that there is barely any 
growth in the new passenger vehicle market in SSA for traditional producers. New passenger 
vehicle exports experienced a compound annual growth rate of only 1.6% per annum in the 
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2003-2013 period, from a very small base. The biggest new car destinations are similar to the 
largest total markets with six of the same countries amongst the 10 largest of both. Most of 
the countries which are large new car importers but not overall markets are relatively small, 
wealthy countries. The new passenger vehicle market in SSA is then either very small, which 
is what was expected, or else possibly new vehicles are imported from production sites in the 
developing world.    
 
Table 14: Top 10 SSA Importers of New Passenger Vehicles from EU, US and Japan, 2013 
 Number Imported 
South Africa 169 361 
Nigeria 19 671 
Benin 8 014 
Angola 7 683 
Ghana 5 997 
Mauritius 2 628 
Senegal 2 136 
Kenya 2 036 
Cote d`Ivoire 2 009 
Gabon 1 644 
Source: Eurostat Comext Database, Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau and US International Trade 
Commission 
 
An alternate measure of the new passenger vehicle market in SSA is to use the data provided 
by Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles (OICA), which is the global 
federation of automobile manufacturers. Their figures are derived from sales or new 
registration data from their members. Most OICA figures are estimates but if accurate they 
suggest that the flow of new cars into SSA is not fully accounted for by trade data from the 
EU, US and Japan. This means that developing world producers could well be a major 
supplier of new vehicles to SSA, just as South Africa is the largest new LCV exporter into the 
region.   
 
Table 15: Producer Figures of the Top 10 New Car Sales Nations in SSA 2013 
 Passenger Cars Sales 
South Africa 450 561 
Nigeria 40 000* 
Botswana 31 122 
Angola 20 000* 
Reunion 19 465 
Mauritius 7 500* 
Ghana 6 600* 
Cote d`Ivoire 4 000* 
Senegal 4 000* 
Tanzania 3 500* 
Source: OICA Sales Data, *represents an estimate 
 
The other major exporters to SSA must then not be ignored. Some of these countries, such as 
Canada, Switzerland and Australia mimic Japan, the EU and US quite closely with their 
export destinations and are not very large scale domestic producers. As such they are 
expected to export mainly used cars. South Africa and Korea have exports which are a mix of 
used and new vehicles. Industry figures show that South Africa exported 78 787 new vehicles 
of all categories to SSA in 2013, while trade statistics show that South Africa exported 
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94 842 passenger vehicles and LCVs into Africa in the same year (Lamprecht, 2015: 39). The 
difference between the two figures is from South African re-exports of Japanese used 
vehicles. However, some markets are certain to be purely new vehicle exports, such as those 
which drive on the opposite side of the road to Japan or are far enough away from Durban 
that using a local port is more cost efficient. For example, passenger vehicles destined for 
West and East Africa from South Africa are almost certainly new as either cheaper, left-hand 
drive, used cars can be accessed from the EU or else transport costs from Durban would not 
justify Japanese used vehicle imports.  
 
Korea is also both an exporter of new and used vehicles, as it has developed a used vehicle 
surplus has appeared and recently shipping links have emerged to export these exports to 
SSA (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2007: 20). However, the sale of new Kia and Hyundai passenger 
vehicles have also seen significant increases experiencing over 100% market share growth in 
some SSA markets. Interviews with industry experts have all emphasised the growing 
popularity of new Korean vehicles.23    
 
Exports from India and Thailand to SSA are also considerable. Both India and Thailand are 
developing countries which have highly productive automotive industries and protected used 
vehicle markets. This makes them cheap producers of new passenger cars, with surplus 
domestic demand for second hand vehicles as the GDP per capita is far below the threshold 
needed for new vehicle purchase (Pelletiere, 2003: 141–143; Clerides, 2008: 324). It is then 
more profitable to sell used vehicles domestically in these countries than shipping them to 
SSA for sale. With this in mind it is most probable that all exports from developing producers 
with protected used vehicle markets are new vehicles. This suggests the possibility of larger 
flows of new cars into SSA than previously thought. 
 
South Africa, which prohibits used car imports, is the largest importer from India followed by 
Nigeria. The scale of Indian exports to South Africa and Nigeria is surprising and has grown 
at rapid compound annual rates of 72.9% and 60.1% respectively for 2003-2013. The trend in 
both countries has been very similar, growing from just 455 vehicles for South Africa and 
852 for Nigeria in 2003 to 108 68324 and 94 084 respectively in 2013. These large import 
figures are used by some to indicate that Indian producers have managed to penetrate the 
passenger vehicle market in SSA more successfully than other producers having developed 
products which can compete with used vehicles (Freemantle and Stevens, 2012). The 
problem with Indian exports to SSA is whether they are actually exporting passenger vehicles 
or other products mistakenly classified as such. Breaking down Indian exports, 96% of South 
African imports are vehicles of more than 1000cc capacity. In Nigeria it is instead vehicles of 
a cylinder capacity not above 1000cc25 which account for nearly 95% of imports.  
 
The below 1000cc category of passenger vehicles is a niche in which Indian firms have 
traditionally excelled, producing very low cost, small vehicles which have come to dominate 
their large domestic market. Additionally, OEMs have recognised both the Indian market size 
                                                          
23 Interviews with Craig Parker, a Senior Consultant at Frost & Sullivan and Michael Lester, Chair Africa 
Export Forum, informed general automotive trends in ownership, aspirations and sales in SSA.   
24 India’s reported figures are slightly larger than the 95 964 light vehicles that South Africa reports to have 
imported from them in 2013 (NAAMSA, 2014).  
25 HS Code 870321 
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and producer capabilities in this product range and located global production of their small 
models in India. For example, Hyundai locates all its production of compact cars in India and 
uses the country as an export base to emerging markets, explicitly targeting Africa (Thakkar, 
2014). Hyundai was India’s largest vehicle exporter in 2013 and is a brand popular with SSA 
consumers (Chauhan, 2014). It is then conceivable that India produces the right product for 
SSA and is exporting new vehicles in previously unthinkable volumes. However, the big 
counterfactual for this is that auto-rickshaws are reported in the 1000cc vehicle category by 
India and demand for these is booming across SSA and Nigeria in particular. Countries in 
SSA either import above or below 1000cc vehicles suggesting differentiated producers and 
products aiming at different markets supporting that they are in fact proxies for auto-
rickshaws and passenger vehicles. This seems a more likely explanation for the export 
statistics than enormous new passenger vehicle demand.   
 
Adding imports from Thailand, India26, China, Turkey and Indonesia27 to the known new 
passenger vehicle import numbers creates quite a different picture of the new passenger 
vehicle market in SSA. Due to uncertainties about the composition of South Korean and 
South African exports to SSA there are upper and lower bounds for the market estimates.  
 
Table 16: SSA New Passenger Vehicle Estimated Markets excluding South Africa, 2013 
 
Lower Estimate Upper Estimate 
Nigeria 31 059 41 779 
Angola 17 599 23 482 
Ethiopia 2 027 2 596 
Ghana 8 770 12 595 
Benin 8 071 8 112 
Tanzania 1 542 1 632 
Mozambique 5 824 6 277 
Kenya 4 456 4 628 
Mauritius 4 096 5 401 
Cote d'Ivoire 2 656 4 004 
Total 104 346 133 220 
Source: UN Comtrade, Eurostat Comext Database, Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau and US International Trade 
Commission 
 
Adding the upper estimate for Nigeria to an estimate of those smuggled from its neighbours28 
and South Africa’s LCV exports then Nigeria’s new light vehicle market stands at 59 903 
vehicles. This is nearly 50% greater than industry estimates for new vehicles. Likewise in 
countries like Angola and Ghana, when combining the upper estimate with South Africa’s 
LCV exports they could have markets 38% and 127% respectively above industry estimates. 
However, even assuming all Korean imports are new and adding South Africa’s LCV exports 
the estimated new light vehicle market for the entirety of SSA, excluding South Africa, is a 
trifling 195 469 vehicles a year.    
                                                          
26 Excluding all below 1000cc vehicle exports.  
27 China, Turkey and Indonesia are the 11th, 12th and 13th largest exporters to SSA and also do not have domestic 
used car surpluses. 




Current Production in SSA 
Africa as a whole accounts for less than 1% of global automotive production (OICA, 2015). 
This is due to there being only three nations with any substantial vehicle assembly or 
production. These are South Africa, Morocco and Egypt with only South Africa and Morocco 
having any degree of globally competitive scale.  OICA estimates show the general lack of 
information about the sector. Even in relatively more developed countries, like Egypt, the 
estimates do not add up, making nonsensical official figures (Table 16). What is clear is that 
there is next to no large scale production on the African continent and in SSA it is confined 
entirely to South Africa.  
Table 17: Production and Assembly in Africa, 2014 
 All Vehicles 
Passenger vehicles Light Commercial 
Vehicles 
Heavy Commercial 
Vehicles and Buses 
South Africa 566 083 277 491 255 629 32 963 
Morocco 231 986* 209 999 21 987  
Egypt 27 020* 17 542  24 973* 
Kenya 3 080*    
Tunisia 1 860*  1 860  
Algeria 1 244 1 244   
Zimbabwe 829*    
Source: OICA Production Data, *represents an estimate 
 
Established National Industries and Clusters 
As the potential for an automotive industry in SSA outside of South Africa is the focus of this 
dissertation, South Africa’s production policies and history are not central. However, as the 
only country in SSA which has established an automotive industry it cannot be ignored. This 
is especially because new producers in the region will have to either compete or cooperate 
with South Africa when attracting investment. The South African experience in and of itself 
is not particularly useful, as SSA is in a fundamentally different position from South Africa 
when it was establishing its industry due to the now globalised automotive industry.29 To 
understand how South Africa developed an automotive industry and the current role South 
Africa plays in the global industry an historical perspective is required. 
 
Black (2001) gives an account of the South African automotive industry and its development. 
In the 1920s assembly first began to occur under highly protectionist policies. Protection 
encouraged diversified assembly and local content requirements were stepped up from the 
1960s to encourage localisation of component production. However, the low volumes of 
assembly across a wide range of makes and models meant that economies of scale were not 
being achieved. Cost structures remained high, making the industry internationally 
uncompetitive. The South African government sought to raise the industry’s competiveness 
through increased international exposure from 1989, launching the Motor Industry 
Development Programme (MIDP) which formalised this process in 1995.  
 
                                                          




The exposure was to drive a rationalisation of the industry concentrating it into more 
competitive producers who would export from South Africa. The rationalisation and export 
focus was encouraged with a policy which allowed exporters to claim rebates on import 
duties for FBU vehicles. In 2013 the Automotive Production and Development Programme 
(APDP) replaced the MIDP, stabilising tariffs at 25% and providing a production incentive. 
The effect of the MIDP and the more recent APDP has been rapid structural change and 
integration into global value chains for South African automotive firms (Black & McLennan, 
2015). This is shown in the passenger vehicle and LCV sectors, where in 2014 South Africa 
exported 51% of production and imported 58% of the domestic market for these vehicles 
(Lamprecht, 2015: 21).     
 
Benabedjil et al. (2015) give a thorough analysis of the only other large scale producer in 
Africa, Morocco. It arose not due to any domestic demand but rather as an enclave of low 
cost production of mass market Renault vehicles, their Dacia platform, for the European 
market. The plant exists purely as an export orientated operation. Its location in Morocco is 
due to combination of factors. Firstly the current plant for Renault’s Dacia vehicles is based 
in Romania and has grown overly large due to unexpected popularity of the vehicles. 
Secondly, the plant in Romania is facing increasing upwards wage pressure from its workers 
and the sustainability of long term low cost manufacturing is questionable. Thirdly, due to 
free trade agreements and geographic proximity the Moroccan government was able to bid on 
equal terms with EU member states to host the factory. Finally, an extremely generous 
incentive package was presented by the Moroccan government to Renault to encourage 
location of the plant in the country. All this is not immediately replicable by SSA nations, as 
they often lack comparable free trade agreements, geographic proximity and human capital. 
However, Egypt is attempting to do something similar and create enclaves producing for the 
Middle East and North Africa. So far it has attracted investments from a number of Chinese 
firms, such as JAC Motors, Geely, Foton and Great Wall Motors to this end (Chao, 2014; 
Gasnier, 2014).          
In SSA, outside of South Africa, what little assembly existed post the 1980s structural 
adjustments was confined to SKD/CKD kit assembly with minimal component production. 
There have been two notable industries that have failed more recently than the 1980s. 
Historically Zimbabwe had some automotive capacity. However, the implementation of the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the 1990s led to reduced protection 
and increased vehicle and component imports, all but destroying Zimbabwe’s automotive 
industry (Black & Muradzikwa, 2004).  Botswana’s membership of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU)30 allowed a group of investors to export SKD assembled Hyundai’s 
to South Africa free of duties from 1995. However, Botswana’s SACU membership also 
required it to adhere to the MIDP, which did not allow for SKD assembly. The plant was 
forced to upgrade to CKD assembly by 1998, requiring high levels of financing to do so. 
Production was short lived as due to financial issues with the holding company the firm 
folded and production stopped in 2004. Some of the component manufacturers have managed 
to continue to exist by exporting to South Africa (Black & Muradzikwa, 2004).  
The two most significant industries to exist for any period of time in SSA outside of South 
Africa have been Kenya and Nigeria. Kenya has assembled SKD and CKD kits since the 
                                                          
30 Whose members are: South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland.  
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mid-1970s. Kenyan Vehicle Manufacturers Ltd, General Motors East Africa (GMEA) and 
Associated Vehicles Assemblers Ltd have assembled LCVs and HCVs for: CMC, DT Dobie, 
Nissan, Land Rover, Mazda, Iveco, Mercedes Benz, Mitsubishi GM and Toyota (Juma, 
2013a). Peak production was in the mid-1980s and dropped substantially in the following 
years, only recently has growth resumed and annual output reached over 7 500 vehicles 
across all categories in 2013 (Juma, 2013a; Ligami, 2014). Nigeria historically had a 
relatively significant assembly industry with Peugeot and Volkswagen developing capacity to 
assemble 63 000 and 45 000 vehicles per annum respectively in the 1980s. Assembly 
declined over time with Peugeot assembling only 6 864 vehicles in 2010 and then closing its 
factory the following year, the last producer to do so (Chamberlain & Ede, 2013).  
Outside of automotive assembly, some SSA nations have limited production capacity in 
aftermarket parts. These firms struggle to compete with Chinese and South African imports. 
This is because they cannot produce at a large scale and South Africa close enough to offset 
any geographic advantage for a firm producing within a domestic market. An exception to 
this is the Nnewi cluster in Nigeria.  Nnewi is a well-established cluster of large, medium and 
small factories manufacturing automotive spares in southeastern Nigeria (Abiola, 2006: 4). It 
is referred to as the ‘Taiwan of Africa’ due to its historic links to Taiwan and automotive 
spare parts production. Links were built through traders initially importing large volumes of 
spare parts from Taiwan for the Nigerian aftermarket industry. This relationship slowly 
transformed as more successful Nigerian traders began importing Taiwanese production 
technologies and hiring their expertise to train Nigerian technicians to localize production and 
lower costs (Abiola, 2006: 4). 
The cluster was also supported by its location within a culturally Igbo area, where long 
established bonds of trust in the community allowed for equipment, employees and 
importantly information to be shared amongst firms (Brautigam, 1997). The cluster produced 
80% of Nigeria’s spare parts when its production peaked in the 1990s, but the difficulties of 
doing business in Nigeria and cheap Chinese imports have eroded production (Abiola, 2006: 
5). Almost all firms require generators, which account for a disproportionate level of firm 
expenditure, poor roads also make transportation of goods out of the cluster and materials 
into it difficult (Abiola, 2006: 16). The response to cheaper Chinese imports has been to 
increase the quality of Nnewi products, but this has only had limited success (Abiola, 2006: 
21). 
Emerging Industries and Clusters  
There is currently no automotive industry of substance in SSA outside of South Africa, but 
this is something firms and governments are looking to change. Interviews suggest that even 
10 years ago the idea that anywhere in SSA other than South Africa could ever have an 
automotive industry was seen as foolish in the extreme. However, as the ‘Africa Rising’ 
narrative has built up steam, driven by the rapid growth occurring in the continent, the idea of 
African automotive producers has begun receiving legitimate interest. Following this a 
number of firms have begun attempting to establish a presence in SSA outside of South 
Africa.  
OEMs from developed nations operate mainly through partnerships with indigenous 
assemblers when they do have an assembly operation in SSA. There are long standing 
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relationships in Kenya and historical ties in countries like Nigeria where firms have 
previously operated. The local assembly partners of firms are often the local distributors of an 
OEM’s vehicles which are then encouraged to invest in assembly if the OEMs view 
expansion into the country as feasible. As Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1998) found, firms are 
only interested in investing where they view there to be significant markets and supportive 
regulatory frameworks. This usually includes tariff differentials between FBU and kit 
vehicles of at least 35% (Reuters, 2014). As SSA changes so developed nation OEMs are 
expressing new interest in assembly in SSA. Interviews suggest the most active developed 
nation OEMs in SSA are: Nissan-Renault, Toyota, Hyundai, Kia and General Motors (GM).  
Nigeria as the economic giant of West Africa and with a newly introduced automotive policy 
has attracted the most attention from OEMs. Nissan-Renault has partnered with the West 
African conglomerate, Stallion Group, which is also its local distributor (Abioye, 2013). This 
has meant that from early 2014 it was the first major OEM to assemble vehicles in Nigeria 
after the introduction of the new Nigerian Automotive Policy (Nissan, 2014). The Stallion 
Group assembly plant can assemble 45 000 SKD kits a year (Abioye, 2013). Hyundai is also 
partnered with Stallion Group and has its products assembled in the same facility as Nissan-
Renault (Alu, 2014). Volkswagen is yet another firm partnered with Stallion Group (Smyth, 
2015). Ford is partnered with Coscharis Group to assemble LCVs for Nigeria and possibly 
West Africa as a whole, importing the SKD kits from South Africa (Ohuocha, 2015; Bisiriyu, 
2014a). Toyota’s distributor in Nigeria also plans to shift to assembly by late 2015 
(Ochonma, 2015). Finally Kia has established a plant to assemble 25 000 SKD kits per 
annum with local firm United Vehicle Assembly Ltd. (Bisiriyu, 2015).  
 
These investments suggest the OEMs are following a very risk averse strategy by letting local 
conglomerates and distributors, who need to assemble cars to avoid tariffs, carry the bulk of 
the cost of setting up plants. It has also meant that all these assembly plants are for very 
rudimentary SKD assembly. As such, economies of scale become less relevant and the larger 
assemblers such as Stallion Group assemble a wide variety of makes and models. Other 
developed world OEMs are waiting to see how the market responds to the new automotive 
policy or assembling on an exceptionally small scale31 (This Day live, 2015). Production in 
Nigeria is then almost entirely motivated by tariff avoidance and the OEM response suggests 
they view assembly as little more than a required cost that their distributors must bear.   
 
Kenya is the largest producer in East Africa and has signalled that it wishes to grow its 
automotive industry. Kenya is pushing for common external tariffs in the EAC and trying to 
attract OEM investment (Olingo, 2014). To this end Nissan-Renault has expressed the desire 
to assemble for the EAC market in Kenya if the tariff protection against FBU imports is 
increased, although there is already a 25% differential between kit and FBU imports (Juma, 
2013a; Reuters, 2014). Hyundai partnered in 2012 with Kenyan Vehicle Manufactures to 
assemble for the EAC market (Miyungu, 2014). The regional Toyota subsidiary, Toyota 
Tsusho, has focused on cautiously expanding in the established Kenya market. It dropped a 
takeover bid for Kenya’s Associated Vehicle Assemblers (AVA) and instead partnered with 
them to assemble 40 Hino trucks and buses a month with the option to expand it to 200 
                                                          
31 For example Honda have retooled a motorcycle factory in Nigeria to produce 1 000 SKD kit vehicles a year 
(This Day live, 2015).           
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(Marete, 2013; Herbling, 2013). Toyota Tsusho has followed this by announcing its intention 
to invest in further assembly in the near future, if the EAC market is viable (Chai, 2015; 
Momanyi, 2015). GM doubled their Kenyan assembly plant’s production from five units a 
day to 10 in 2013 (Juma, 2013b). If Kenya is successful in creating a common external tariff 
in the EAC and a more conducive customs regime then it is very well positioned to become 
the regional OEM assembler for the growing EAC market.    
 
Nigeria and Kenya are by far the greatest focus of developed world OEM interest in SSA. 
Ethiopia, which has a highly protected very small market is the only other possible interest. 
Nissan has mooted plans to partner with their distributor in the Ethiopian market for small 
scale SKD assembly (Asfaw, 2013). Likewise, Hyundai are in negotiations with Marathon 
Motors, owned by famous runner Haile Gebrselassie, to establish a small SKD assembly 
plant (The Reporter, 2015). Other OEM’s distributors assemble on such a small scale, so as to 
avoid tariffs, that it is irrelevant (Norbrook, 2011).32  The only other developed world OEM 
plant of any size in SSA is a Hyundai SKD plant in Mozambique built with their local 
partners Somyong Motors assembling 4 500 vehicles a year from late 2014 (Mpofu, 2014). In 
SSA, outside the EAC or Nigeria, the prospects for developed world OEMs driving the 
establishment of a vehicle assembly industry at any level beyond very basic SKD processes 
seem unlikely.  
 
Investment in SSA by Chinese firms establishing small scale SKD assembly plants has been 
more aggressive and far reaching than any of the developed world OEMs. This is 
symptomatic  of general Chinese automotive investment strategies. The Chinese automotive 
sector has been increasing its level of outward direct investment (ODI) and since 2003 it has 
been the top sector for Chinese ODI (Amighini & Franco, 2013: 149). This has in turn made 
China the top investor abroad amongst developing nations in the automotive industry 
(Amighini & Franco, 2013: 149). Chinese investors target non-high income nations and 
invest mostly based on market size, regardless of stability or efficiency of labour markets 
(Amighini & Franco, 2013: 149). These investments are generally not a substitute for 
Chinese exports, but rather to actually support export activities, with the firms never looking 
to achieve anything beyond SKD ‘screw driver’ assembly while importing all components 
from China (Amighini & Franco, 2013: 150).  
 
This strategy is an extension of China having concentrated on developing market dominance 
in producing automotive parts rather than FBU vehicles. While China has established itself as 
a major global player in components production, generating a substantial trade surplus, it is 
still in fact a net importer of FBU vehicles (Amighini, 2012: 329-331). Its strategy of 
overseas assembly is used to support its domestic components industry through multiple 
channels. Firstly, in highly protected markets, SKD assembly is often necessary if the market 
is to be accessed at all. Secondly, by providing local employment and investment, no matter 
how limited, the firms are able to secure political and popular support by marketing the 
vehicles as locally made. Finally, where cheap labour exists ‘screw driver’ assembly can 
allow for cheaper transport costs on a per vehicle basis, when roll-on roll-off shipping is not 
an option.    
                                                          
32 For example a local distributor assembles around 200 Fiats per annum in his repair shop in Addis Abba 




As a result of this strategy Chinese investments or partnerships in assembly are either being 
investigated or implemented in: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Table 17). The firms investing include but are not limited 
to: Foton, Geely, Lifan, Great Wall Motors, Build Your Dreams, JAC Motors, Joylong, GAC 
MOTOR and Higer Bus. These investments are focused on either relatively large potential 
markets, such as Kenya, Uganda and Cameroon or else protected markets such as Ethiopia. In 
markets at the smaller end of the scale, such as Ethiopia and Uganda, most of the investments 
are true ‘screw driver’ plants which have capacities of only 1 to 2 thousand vehicles per 
annum in a vast range of models33 (Bekele, 2012; Dyson, 2012; Fikade, 2013; Heuler, 2013; 
Gebreselassie; 2013; Chao, 2014; Bisiriyu, 2014b; Ochonma, 2014a; Balami, 2014; Weihua, 
2014; Etyang, 2015; Farge, 2015).  In the larger potential market of Kenya, Foton have a 
10 000 units per annum LCV and HCV SKD assembly plant (Senelwa, 2012).  
 
Nigeria is the focus of most Chinese firms’ SSA expansion, much like developed world 
OEMs. In a similar fashion, the Chinese firms are partnering with local business groups, to 
assemble a wide range of makes and models. Interestingly some firms assembling Chinese 
automotive products claim to already be assembling CKD rather than SKD kits. These are by 
and large HCV and bus assemblers. By far the largest of these is the Nigerian firm R. T. 
Brisco, who are major vehicle distributors and claim to have capacity to  produce 45 000 
CKD kits a year of BYD trucks and busses (NADDC, 2015). Similarly Richbon Nigeria 
claims capacity to assemble 16 500 CKD kit Sinotrucks and 15 000 Xiamen King buses, 
while National Truck Manufactures claim to assemble 5 000 Sinotrucks CKD kits (NADDC, 
2015).  General Appliances West Africa is recorded as building a 6 000 unit capacity CKD 
assembly plant for BIGST SUVs and LCVs (NADDC, 2015). This all seems unlikely and 
since CKD assembly attracts half the tariff level of SKD assembly it is likely that the term 
CKD is being generously used by firms. 
 
As yet no Chinese passenger vehicle assemblers state that their assembly will be of anything 
other than SKD kits. Unlike the HCV and bus plants that are typically for a single brand the 
Chinese light vehicle plants plan to produce a large range of brands and models. This means 
plants like Coscharis Group’s, will assemble 15 000 SKD kits a year for Jinagsu Joylong, 
other Chinese brands as well as Ford (NADDC, 2015). Likewise Kewalram Group claims to 
be in the process of establishing a 15 000 SKD kits a year plant for Foton, Chery, JMC and 
others (Bisiriyu, 2014b; Ochonma, 2014a, 2014b; NADDC, 2015).  How many of the 
proposed Chinese investments actually come to fruition is uncertain, but there is certainly 
significant interest in SSA from China’s many vehicle manufacturers.  
 
The rhetoric used to describe indigenous firms which have established themselves in SSA is 
highly problematic. There is very little critical questioning of the firms, instead media and the 
public are only too willing to accept fanciful claims of ingenuity, high local content levels 
and employment (Mensah, 2014; Ufford, 2014; Owusu, 2015; Mulupi, 2015).34  Although 
many of the firms are genuinely impressive, it seems unlikely that any of them are the 
harbingers of SSA’s industrialisation. The huge desire of the citizens of SSA to have a 
                                                          
33 The largest operating actual plant is a 3 000 unit Lifan plant in Ethiopia (Weihua, 2014)  
34 For the full stories according to local and international media see Appendix F.  
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‘Henry Ford’ emerge in the region has encouraged enterprising businessmen to be painted as 
national heroes and in one case a messiah.  
There are five ‘indigenous’ firms which have received the most media attention and made the 
most progress towards automotive assembly of any scale. They are: Innoson Vehicle 
Manufacturing (IVM) part of the Innoson Group in Nigeria; Mobius Motors in Kenya; 
Kantanka, which is controlled by the Apostle Safo Suaye Technology Research Centre 
(ASSTRC) in Ghana; Kiira Motors Corporation (KMC), funded by the state owned Uganda 
Development Corporation and Matchedje Motors in Mozambique. Additionally there are a 
number of indigenous firms which have either already failed, such as Holland Car35 in 
Ethiopia, or else have no foreseeable way to produce anything beyond a handful of vehicles a 
year. These include the government supported efforts of TATC in Tanzania and the Karenjy 
in Madagascar (Karani, 2013; iol, 2014; Bekele, 2015). 
 
Unfortunately, where the productive capacity for this assembly suddenly emerged from has 
not been investigated and owners’ claims are heralded. This is especially important since both 
IVM and Kantanka claim to assemble CKD kits at very low volumes and use incredibly high 
levels of local content, 60% in the case of IVM (Abone, 2014; Ufford, 2014; Emmanuel, 
2014; Vanguard, 2014; Yeboah, 2015). Interestingly, the vehicles produced by these 
indigenous firms have a more than passing resemblance to well-known Chinese brands 
(Figures 2-4). It would seem that rather than being the truly locally developed brands, they 
are locally owned, or co-owned, assemblers of rebadged Chinese vehicles.  
 
Figure 2: IVM Carrier and GONOW New Fan Pickup  
 
Source: Innoson Vehicle 2015; Alibaba 2015 
 
Figure 3: Kantanka SUV and Foday Explorer 6 
                                                          
35 Holland Car received much fanfare establishing an SKD plant in Ethiopia for Chinese vehicles. However, it 
did not deliver on 200 pre-purchased vehicles in 2012 and the owner fled the country, just three years after 




Source: Kantanka 2015; Alibaba 2015 
 
Figure 4: Matchedje Pickup and Foday F16 
 
Source: Matchedje 2015; Alibaba 2015 
 
The media campaigns of these firms have been so powerful that even respected news 
organisations like the BBC claim that these vehicles are “designed and manufactured” in SSA 
countries (BBC, 2015a). The reality is that an enterprising Chinese vehicle assembly 
company called the China Chongqing Big Science and Technology Development Group 
(BIG) has begun to export assembly plants from China.36 They expressly target African 
countries, noting that Nigeria has “a very good policy” for their products, and will agree to a 
joint partnership if three requirements are met. These are: there must be a 30-35% differential 
in tariffs for FBU and SKD vehicles; the interested African party needs to contribute capital 
of $1 million and 10 000m2 of land, of which 3 000m2 is a workshop. BIG stresses that not 
meeting these requirements is not necessarily a deal breaker, interested parties should contact 
them anyway, especially if they have either experience in automotive sales or good relations 
with their government.37 If a firm has greater resources they can buy a plant outright and then 
there are a plethora of Chinese firms willing to export kits and parts to them (Made-in-
China.com, 2015). 
                                                          
36 This section draws extensively from BIG’s Overseas Vehicle Assembly Projects Department’s Alibaba page 
where purchases can be made (http://bigmtauto.en.alibaba.com/)  
37 This is so that they can “get good policies or maybe government order for the assembly project and plant” 




BIG and firms like it are the hard edge of the Chinese strategy to spur demand for automotive 
parts by encouraging kit assembly in protected markets. BIG actively seeks partners in 
protected markets and offers significant up front services for the relatively small cost of 
collaborating in a joint venture with them. They design and build the plant and supply the 
equipment and technical assistance required to make it work. Their assembly processes are 
made up of modular workshops and aimed at producing so as to precisely meet tariff 
requirements. They even offer to assist firms to produce low value products such as, tyres, 
tubes, batteries and springs locally if ‘CKD’ assembly needs to be shown. The most complex 
assembly process they provide involves: preparation, welding, painting, chassis work, final 
assembly and then testing.38 However, in the early stages of SKD it is a far more basic 
process.  
 
LCVs are all that are produced in the most basic plants BIG offers to establish. With more 
modules more complex SKD assembly occurs and SUVs can be assembled. Passenger 
vehicles are only assembled in the most complex assembly process supplied by BIG, which is 
designed to meet CKD assembly tariff requirements. BIG uses low tech, highly labour 
intensive practises to achieve this, as such assembly volumes are necessarily very low and 
cannot be scaled up easily. Profitability is driven by the substantial effective rates of 
protection enjoyed by assemblers in these markets and low labour costs. What level of 
complexity is supplied to a partner is at the discretion of BIG and whether they see potential 
in the market.  
 
BIG supplies all the SKD or ‘CKD’ kits assembled as well as providing the aftermarket parts. 
They boast “with this method, you can achieve lots of profits and success, you have greatly 
reduced the customs duty and shipping freight…” and “seize this chance, you will win, we 
will win both of us win”. Certainly this offer has been readily accepted in Africa, where 60% 
of their business takes place and they have operations in Egypt, Ghana, Angola and Nigeria. 
While not all of these are rebadging operations, this is also an explicit service they offer 
allowing African firms to “create and develop your own auto brand, logo and also expand 
into neighbouring countries using preferential tariffs”.   
 
While the stories attached to brands such as IVM, Kantanka and Matchedje are indeed 
fascinating they are not as they present themselves. They are not innovators and any 
innovation in production or design is from their Chinese suppliers. Their continued growth is 
reliant on high tariffs to protect their inefficiently assembled Chinese vehicles, which are not 
substantially cheaper than other brands. However, not all prominent indigenous firms are 
following this route, two firms; Mobius Motors and Kiira are making waves with locally 
designed vehicles.      
 
Mobius Motors is the brain child of British entrepreneur Joel Jackson. It was founded in 2009 
with the goal of creating a cheap vehicle suitable for the rugged roads of rural Kenya 
(Mulupi, 2015). Jackson has proven to be exceptionally adept at attracting talent and 
investors. Its investors include American billionaire Ronald Lauder, former Citigroup 
chairman Richard Parsons and Mahesh Chandaria, a Kenyan billionaire (Herbling, 2014). 
                                                          
38 See Appendix E for diagram.  
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The board of advisors is a similarly heavy weight group including a smattering of former 
Ford and General Motors (GM) executives along with a McKinsey & Company director and 
the former Safricom CEO Michael Joseph (Mobius, 2015). In 2014 they released their first 
purchasable vehicle, the Mobius II, which is a spartan eight-seater affair with no power 
steering, air conditioning, glass windows or interior features (Ramsey, 2014).  
 
Mobius claims that local content is 35% and they hope to raise it to 40% in the near future, 
which seems very ambitious given that they want to increase production and currently 
produce next to no components (Ciuri, 2013). Strikingly, the vehicle does not seem to meet 
its fundamental goal of being affordable as it retails at $11 000, in a country where per capita 
incomes are around $1 350, although it is the cheapest new vehicle on the market (Mulupi, 
2015; World Bank, 2015). So far 50 have been produced to test the market but the Mobius 
plant has capacity to produce upwards of 500 a year (Blair, 2014).  
 
Another East African venture is based in Uganda. In 2006 students at Makerere University in 
Uganda were involved in a three year Vehicle Design Summit organised by the 
Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT), focusing on designing an electric car (Mulupi, 
2014). Following their involvement in the summit the students designed and built an electric 
vehicle called the Kiira EV in 2011 (Mulupi, 2014). This incredibly simple vehicle sparked 
the interest of the Ugandan Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives which created the 
Kiira Motors Corporation (KMC), with the aim to develop a more advanced Kiira vehicle and 
produce it commercially (Mulupi, 2014). 
 
In late 2014 the Kiira EV SMACK was released, a hybrid five seater sedan set to retail at 
over $30 000 (Mulupi, 2014). KMC needs $350 million to create its production facilities 
(Mulupi, 2014).  If it is able to source this funding it will produce 10 000 vehicles a year. 
While the majority of the investment has not been secured KMC is in negotiations with the 
Hinduja group and has an assistance agreement with RLE engineering (Mulupi, 2014; 
African Review, 2014). Most notably the Ugandan government has invested $70 million 
through the Ugandan Development Corporation into KMC, as well as barred other 
assemblers from assembling sedans in Uganda so as to not compete with the SMACK 
(Odeke, 2014; Mulupi, 2014; Sekalo, 2014). Little of the vehicle seems locally assembled 
(Nyambura & Njoroge, 2015). In all this seems to be a very poor use of state funds as it is 
highly unlikely that the remaining $270 million will be found and even if it is, the market for 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 4: African Aspirations 
In recent years there has been increasing interest from countries in SSA to create policy 
frameworks which foster domestic vehicle assembly. The policies employed by these 
countries are varied. Some support economy wide industrialisation, expecting an automotive 
industry to emerge naturally as an element of this approach. Others are targeting the 
automotive industry specifically with support. In some cases, individual firms have been the 
target of industry promotion strategies. Any change of the policy status quo amongst 
countries in SSA also affects the only established industry in the region, South Africa. 
 
Automotive Strategies in SSA 
The most notable policy regimes for the automotive industry in SSA, outside of South Africa, 
are in Nigeria and Ethiopia. Nigeria has a detailed industrial policy for the industry and 
Ethiopia has extremely high levels of protection. Other countries which have received recent 
investment in the automotive industry, such as Kenya, Ghana, Cameroon, Senegal, 
Mozambique and Uganda, do not have comprehensive automotive development plans. Some 
of them, such as Kenya, have tariff differentials between kit assembly and FBUs, but the 
difference is not high or part of a coherent automotive strategy (Juma, 2013a). Rather, the 
combination of growing domestic markets and increased regional integration has attracted 
investors.  
 
As discussed in the previous section there is by no means a flood of productive automotive 
investment into these countries. Where automotive investment has occurred in SSA it has 
been met with a far from uniform response. In Mozambique and Ghana the prospect of local 
rebadging operations has tapped into a sense of nationalism about the automotive industry. 
Their governments have pledged to use the rebadged vehicles for their fleets. The state also 
encourages locals to purchase these vehicles over ‘less patriotic’ foreign brands, which are 
portrayed as a drain of foreign exchange (Mensah, 2014; Africa Redemption Magazine, 
2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Owusu, 2015; Gasnier, 2015). Uganda has gone further and facilitated 
investments in one tiny indigenous firm and made it more difficult for international rivals to 
assemble any competitor in Uganda. This involved delaying permission for plants to be built 
and then only allowing LCV and HCV assembly at the plants, once permission was finally 
granted (Emorut, 2013; Odeke, 2014; Sekalo, 2014).   
Nigeria 
The country most aggressively pursuing an automotive industry in SSA, outside of South 
Africa, is Nigeria.40 The automotive policy for Nigeria was developed following the 
introduction of a general Nigerian Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP). The NIRP seeks to 
diversify the economy away from a dependence on oil exports, with the goal of increasing  
the contribution of manufacturing to GDP from 4% in 2014 to 10% in 2017 (Nigeria, 2014). 
Part of the general drive to increase manufacturing includes a focus on vehicle assembly, 
which was once a major contributor to the manufacturing sector. In 2014 Nigeria claimed to 
have an installed capacity to assemble 108 000 passenger vehicles, 56 000 commercial 
                                                          
40 This draws on an interview with Alec Erwin, former South African Trade and Industry Minister and advisor 
to the Nigerian government on its automotive industry.  
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vehicles, 10 000 tractors and 1 000 000 motorcycles annually. If the capacity still existed in 
2014 it was hardly used. Even the Nigerian government suggests that vehicle assembly was at 
less than 10% of capacity in 2014, in reality it was even less than this (Chamberlain & Ede, 
2013; NAC, 2014a). The Nigerian government believes that 200 000 passenger vehicles are 
imported a year of which 50 000 are new. The government logic is that if imports are 
restricted then at least 100 000 new vehicles could be assembled for the domestic market, 
reviving the Nigerian automotive industry (NAC, 2014a).   
 
Erwin (2015) suggests that pressure on Nissan’s Africa operation to establish a second 
assembly plant in Africa encouraged them to actively seek a viable African market. To this 
end they partnered with the Nigerian conglomerate, Stallion Group. Under their agreement 
with Nissan, Stallion Group started to invest in a mothballed assembly plant. This investment 
alerted the Nigerian government to the potential that the automotive industry could be 
revived. The government quickly charged the National Automotive Council (NAC) of 
Nigeria, a previously defunct organisation, with creating a policy to stimulate growth in the 
automotive industry. The result was the National Automotive Industry Development Plan 
(NAIDP), presented by the NAC as a route to develop a sustainable automotive industry in 
Nigeria.  
 
The NAIDP puts forward exactly the kind of protection that potential assemblers were 
looking for. The NAIDP is a detailed 10 year program of industry support through multiple 
measures, although Erwin cautions that the presented timeline is overly ambitious. The 
NAIDP broke up vehicle imports into four levels of assembly: FBU vehicles are fully 
imported; SKD2 is the lowest level of assembly and essentially involves ‘screwdriver plants’; 
SKD1’s main difference from SKD2 is that kits are unpainted, so plants need a paint shop 
and CKD assembly involves all materials being supplied loose, requiring final welding and 
assembly to happen at the Nigerian plant (NAC, 2014b: 21-22). The NAIDP’s primary tool to 
create a sustainable industry was to revoke a blanket 20% tariff across all vehicle and kit 
imports and instead set specific tariffs for the various levels of assembly. Erwin argues that 
creating multiple degrees of assembly, specifically allowing a SKD2 classification, was 
designed to reduce barriers to investment and attract it as quickly as possible. Once firms 
have invested and overcome the difficulties of doing business in Nigeria, then differentiated 
tariffs are intended to encourage them to deepen their investment.  
 
The actual tariff policy of the NAIDP is detailed in Table 18. Unfortunately it seems the 
difference in levels of protection do not change much over time and are unlikely to encourage 
any increases in investment. The difference in levels of protection between SKD2 and CKD 
are just 10% for the entire 10 year period, compared with a 60% differential between SKD2 
and FBU imports. This means that as long as SKD2 kits are 10% less expensive than a CKD 
kit then SKD2 will enjoy a higher effective rate of protection on its value added. When the 
high fixed costs of creating CKD production in a small market are considered then a 10% 
greater per unit cost is not at all inconceivable. Additionally SKD2 assemblers are still able to 
access non-tariff incentives. This then begs the question as to why assembly firms would ever 
invest beyond superficial SKD2 plants.    
 
Table 19: NAIDP Duty Structure 
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Period FBU - PV FBU - CV SKD2 SKD1 CKD Additional Incentives 
2014 -
2015 
70%* 35% 10% 5% 0% 
Import of FBU – PVs at 35% or CVs 
at 20% equal to double the number 
of CKD or SKD kits imported 
2016 - 
2018 
70%* 35% 10% 5% 0% 
Import of FBU – PVs at 35% or CVs 
at 20% equal to the number of CKD 
or SKD kits imported 
2019 - 
2024 
55%+ 35% 10% 5% 0% 
Import of FBU – PVs at 35% or CVs 
at 20% equal to half the number of 
CKD or SKD kits imported 
Source: NAC 2014 
*Constituted of 35% duty on all FBUs and an additional 35% levy on passenger vehicles irrespective of whether 
they are new or used 
+ Constituted of 35% duty on all FBUs and an additional 20% levy on passenger vehicles 
            
There has been resistance to the policy from consumers and vehicle importers. This resistance 
led to three delays in implementing the tariff hikes. They were first meant to be implemented 
in July 2014, then January of the next year, then April and finally were implemented on the 
1st of July 2015 (Nnabugwu, 2015; Bisiriyu & Oseghale, 2015). The official reason for the 
delays was the lack of installed capacity in the automotive industry (Nnabugwu, 2015). This 
is suspicious given that in 2014 the Nigerian government claimed to have installed capacity 
to assemble 108 000 passenger vehicles and a maximum new vehicle market of 100 000 after 
tariff introduction (NAC, 2014a). Unofficially, many speculated that the closeness of the 
election in early 2015 was the real motivator for delays, with neither side wanting to go 
against popular opinion until their position was secure (Nnabugwu, 2015).  
 
The tariff hike and the NAIDP’s allowance for assemblers to import FBU vehicles at reduced 
tariff rates encouraged a large number of firms to promptly declare their intention to assemble 
in Nigeria. This is exactly what Erwin was hoping for by allowing low barriers to assembly. 
The NAC claimed that in 2014 as many as 23 firms signed up to the programme, resulting in 
the contribution to GDP by the automotive assembly sector increasing by 26% (Furlonger, 
2014; Nnabugwu, 2015). By the middle of 2015 the levels of interest had grown to 35 firms 
in various stages of investment and production (NADDC, 2015). The NADDC, formerly the 
NAC41, documents the 35 firms are listed as already having installed capacity to assemble 
320 920 vehicles a year, across all categories (NADDC, 2015). Incredibly they claim 
installed CKD assembly capacity of 140 630 units a year of which the vast majority are 
trucks and buses (NADDC, 2015). Despite these huge ‘capacity’ claims even the NADDC 
expects only 23 071 vehicles to actually be assembled in 2015, 47% are from ‘CKD’ plants 
namely: IVM, Peugeot and Leyland. This application of the NAIDP’s CKD definition seems 
to be very generous. IVM has been discussed previously and it is unlikely that it is close to 
true CKD. Leyland and Peugeot are historic producers in Nigeria and their previously 
mothballed plants may well have been CKD assemblers in the 1970s and are now using those 
same processes.    
 
The unfortunate reality is that to avoid the newly imposed tariffs, vehicle distributors are 
importing FBU vehicles without their wheels or bonnets attached and claiming that they are 
SKD2 kits (Echenim, 2015). This allows them to pay a tariff of 10%, lower even than the pre-
                                                          
41 As the NAIDP has grown the NAC merged with the Centre for Automotive Design and Development 
(CADD) and was re-designated the NADDC. 
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hike 20%. These firms  also then face a much reduced tariff rate on their imports of twice the 
number of FBU vehicles than the number of ‘SKD2’ kits they import (NAC, 2014b; 
Echenim, 2015). Despite firms dodging the tariff, vehicle prices increased by between 20% 
and 50% after its implementation, suggesting some firms are making exceptional profits 
(Bisiriyu & Oseghale, 2015). The price increase is mostly driven by a reduced supply of low 
cost second hand vehicles. There has been an up to 70% reduction in the number vehicles 
arriving in Nigerian ports (Bisiriyu & Oseghale, 2015). This environment is extremely 
attractive to firms like BIG who are able to use the massive effective rates of protection to 
sell their cheap, marginally locally assembled, vehicles at high prices.   
 
Along with the tariff incentives for assembly there are other NAIDP policies to encourage an 
automotive industry. These include: industrial infrastructure development, skills 
development, standards, investment promotion and a vehicle purchase scheme (NAC, 2014c). 
The NAIDP proposes that automotive supplier parks and clusters can be developed with the 
infrastructure required by the automotive industry (NAC, 2014c). Islands of effective 
infrastructure provision would allow the serious infrastructure limitations of Nigeria to be 
redressed, giving automotive firms access to the logistics, energy and other infrastructure 
they need. The Nigerian government does not plan to cover the cost of cluster infrastructure 
themselves. Rather they hope to encourage firms to build the infrastructure they need by 
making 20% of any infrastructure investment tax deductible (Aderemi, 2014).  
 
How many clusters will emerge is unknown but three existing clusters have been identified 
with the hope they will form the core of the industry. They are: Lagos-Ogun-Oyo, Kaduna-
Kano and Enugu-Anambra (NAC, 2014c). These ‘clusters’ cover very large areas, for 
example, it is over 230 kilometres from Lagos to Oyo and Kaduna to Kano. Enugu is slightly 
closer to Anambra at 80 kilometres. The Lagos-Ogun-Oyo region cluster has received by far 
the most interest. Of the 35 assembly plants the NADDC has registered, 28 are in Lagos-
Ogun-Oyo (NADDC, 2015). This is also the cluster where all the major OEM linked local 
firms are located. Nissan, Kia, Hyundai, Honda, Toyota, Ford, MG, Mitsubishi and Isuzu are 
all being assembled in this cluster. Kaduna is the historical location of Peugeot’s Nigeria 
operations and has little else in it (NADDC, 2015). Mercedes’s HCV operation and IVM’s 
assembly plant are located in Enugu-Anambra (NADDC, 2015). As yet no procedures to 
supply special infrastructure to these ‘clusters’ or to foster linkages have been implemented. 
Instead the clustering in Lagos-Ogun-Oyo, where the best infrastructure currently exists, 
suggests that firms do not intend to invest heavily and create infrastructure for the Nigerian 
government, unless it is absolutely necessary.   
 
The skills development and standards sections of the NAIDP call for appropriate bodies to be 
established to ensure there are skilled workers and high standards in the industry (NAC, 
2014c). Whether these measures will be implemented in any meaningful fashion is not 
certain. The NAIDP aims to promote investment through a number of means. The core 
investment promotion polices include the all-important tariffs and a requirement that all 
vehicles purchased by the government are locally assembled (NAC, 2014c). The second 
measure is to reduce smuggling. It is planned to achieve this using an upgraded National 
Vehicles Identification System (NVISA) and more thorough customs procedures. These 
include that vehicles will supposedly be escorted from neighbouring country’s ports to the 
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Nigerian border, to ensure they are not smuggled through (NAC, 2014c). The final two 
avenues to contribute to securing investment are: the long term nature of the NAIDP and the 
active marketing of Nigeria to OEMs (NAC, 2014c).  
 
The last tenet of the NAIDP is a vehicle purchase scheme. It is viewed by commentators as a 
cushion against public anger at rising vehicle prices. It would involve reduced interest rate 
vehicle financing for members of the public purchasing vehicles, it will be in part funded by 
the higher tariffs on FBU vehicles (NAC, 2014c). The NADDC and the South African 
vehicle loan provider WesBank have come to an agreement to this end (Echenim, 2015). The 
scheme will allow loans for locally assembled vehicles to be accessed at 10% to 12% interest 
rates, against the currently available loans which have interest rates in excess of 20% 
(Nnabugwu, 2015). However, many of the policies outlined have so far not been 
implemented and those that have continue to face significant obstacles. There are already 
accusations that firms who are dodging the tariff increase with false SKD2 assembly are 
trying to also take advantage of the loan scheme (Echenim, 2015). Additionally, the number 
of FBU vehicles shipped to neighbouring Benin has increased by more than 50% in the first 
month of 2015, as more vehicles are smuggled across the border (Games, 2015).   
 
For Nigeria’s automotive industry to be sustainable there has to be local component 
production, or else SKD assembly is just a redistribution exercise from consumers to 
assemblers. To move from SKD2 to SKD1 and then CKD requires both increased plant 
investments from assemblers as well as component manufacturers. There are right now very 
few component suppliers, outside of the Nnewi cluster. Some did exist in the 1980s but have 
largely closed down, for example in Lagos-Ogun-Oyo area there were once: battery 
producers, brake pad producers, tyre manufactures, glass suppliers and body parts producers 
(Oladele, 2014). To encourage component manufacturers to invest the NAC was given 
legislative power to increase tariffs on specified components by up to 35% (NAC, 2014c). 
There has yet to be a specified policy on how a local content scheme would work and what 
components will or won’t qualify for protection. However, the intention is clear that there 
will be some local content scheme to encourage investment in Nigeria from component 
producers. SKD2 assemblers will most probably resist these measures and their large 
numbers will make them a considerable political obstacle to the industry progressing beyond 
their form of ‘screwdriver’ assembly. 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is the most protected automotive market in SSA and with a population of nearly 95 
million people it is a potentially attractive investment location for OEMs. Ethiopia’s 
protectionist structure has many levels which make all vehicles expensive, but especially so if 
they are FBU imports. The first barrier is that a FBU that is to be imported must arrive in 
Djibouti on a ship operated by the state owned Ethiopia Shipping Lines. The second is that 
the main route into Ethiopia is from Djibouti42 and transport costs are notoriously high, 
reaching up to $4 000 per container traveling from Djibouti to Addis (Jobson & Van Valen, 
2014). Following these costs a FBU vehicle will be subject to a 35% tariff on its total cost, 
which includes transport and insurance (Abiye, 2014; 2Merkato, 2009). An excise tax must 
                                                          
42 Ethiopia is a landlocked country which lost its access to its historical ports when Eritrea seceded.    
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then be paid of between 30% and 100% of the total cost plus the tariff amount, the percentage 
value of the excise tax is determined by engine size (Abiye, 2014; 2Merkato, 2009). VAT of 
15% is then paid on the new total amount, followed by 10% surtax and 46% sundry taxes 
(Abiye, 2014; 2Merkato, 2009).  
 
These barriers mean that a 1989 or 1990 Toyota Corolla will sell for $14 000 to $15 500, 
compared to between $1 600 and $2 500 for the same car in South Africa (Abiye, 2014). 
Vehicle assemblers face a slightly reduced level of taxation. They are exempt from the surtax 
of 10% as well as the sundry taxes of 46% and instead of a 35% tariff pay only 5%, which is 
pushed to 10% if they are regular importers (Abiye, 2014). These tax breaks have led to an 
influx of 13 assemblers operating in Ethiopia. The reduced taxes result in a newly assembled 
Lifan 520i costing $13 900, but this is still far above the $8 300 for the same model sold in 
South Africa (Oosthuizen, 2011; Abiye, 2014). The combination of high vehicle costs and 
low income levels, GDP per capita is $568, means that demand is limited (World Bank, 
2015). The entire Ethiopian passenger vehicle and LCV market is only 19 100 vehicles per 
annum and assembly capacity is below 6 000 vehicles a year.  
 
The protectionist policies in Ethiopia are about state revenue first and promoting assembly 
second. The Metal Industry Development Institute, the government body responsible for the 
automotive industry, along with the Automotives and Machineries Importers & Assembly 
Sectoral Association, the industry association, both want to change this and ramp up 
Ethiopian assembly (Dyson, 2012; Gebrehiwot, 2014). To this end the Ethiopian Revenue 
and Customs Authority recognised that it may need to increase the differential in tariffs and 
taxes to encourage local manufacturing (Abiye, 2014). However, with such low levels of 
domestic demand, Ethiopia is many years away from achieving economies of scale, unless it 
is able to substantially lower vehicle prices. Any industry would then need to be more 
competitive, surviving with reduced protection or exporting if it is to be sustainable.                 
 
South African Response  
The African market is of great importance to South Africa and has been the destination for up 
to 29% of South African passenger vehicle and LCV exports (Lamprecht, 2015: 49). This 
relationship is a one way trade with South Africa importing less than R150 million in 2014 
from the rest the continent, compared to the R31 621 million exported (Lamprecht, 2015:38-
83). This relationship could well change if other African countries start to assemble vehicles 
instead of importing FBUs from South Africa. Therefore, the automotive policies of other 
African nations are of great concern to South Africa’s government, producers and the over 
100 000 workers in the sector (OICA, 2015).  
South Africa’s exports to the rest of Africa have already been negatively affected where more 
restrictive import regimes have been implemented. The biggest negative impact so far came 
from outside SSA, Algeria is the largest African market for South Africa and light vehicle 
exports decreased by 49% between 2013 and 2014 (Lamprecht, 2015: 38-39). This is due to 
Algeria stopping government support for firms buying LCVs (Furlonger, 2015). Exports of 
light vehicles to Nigeria also fell 11% in the 2013 to 2014 period (Lamprecht, 2015: 38-39). 
Worryingly for South Africa, the decrease in exports to Nigeria occurred before the higher 
tariff rate was implemented, in July 2015. While uncertainty about policy may have created a 
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dip in exports, it is likely that the real impact on South African exports of the Nigerian tariff 
hike is yet to be felt.  
Two distinct camps have emerged as to what the longer term impact of Nigerian automotive 
policy will be for South African industry. The one view that Erwin espouses is that Nigeria 
was always going to get into automotives eventually and South Africa can either fight this, 
fruitlessly, or try to benefit from it in some way. Erwin’s suggested way to benefit is to create 
a special relationship between Nigeria and South Africa. This could result in Nigeria giving 
preference for components and kits exported from South Africa in exchange for assistance in 
establishing a high quality assembly industry. As the Nigerian industry grows, so the 
countries can specialise, with Erwin suggesting that Nigeria would focus on plastics and 
rubber components and South Africa electronics and metals. Likewise, Erwin is confident 
that Nigeria will produce some models and South Africa others (Smyth, 2015). This view is 
echoed by Nissan South Africa’s managing director Mike Whitfield, who has driven Nissan’s 
entry into Nigeria (Cokayne, 2014a). Despite initial resistance, Erwin and likeminded 
associates have convinced NAAMSA and the DTI of this view and so it has become the 
official South African stance on the Nigerian automotive policy (Cokayne, 2014b, 2014c). 
There are other industry players who are concerned that if the Nigerian automotive industry 
takes off, it will start to take business away from South Africa (Smyth, 2015). If Nigeria 
assembles the same models as South Africa, but sources their kits and components from 
elsewhere, this will deprive South Africa of potentially its largest export market in Africa. 
Nigeria could go further and export its assembled vehicles to ECOWAS countries if the 
group creates a common external tariff, denying South Africa an even larger market (Smyth, 
2015). It is quite probable that kits and components won’t be sourced from South Africa. This 
is because it is not among the most competitive automotive manufacturing industries in the 
world. Geographically South Africa is not even as close to Nigeria as Western Europe, or 
major developing world producers such as Turkey. 
If different models are being assembled in Nigeria than are produced by South Africa then 
there is no hope of South Africa supplying the kits. The Nigeria automotive policy could also 
have the possible effect of drawing FDI away from South Africa. As the SSA market grows 
producers may invest in true manufacturing in South Africa, as is required by the APDP, with 
exports to the region justifying the required scale of production, which would be 
unsupportable by the South African domestic market. However, if the large regional markets 
are protected firms could instead opt to build low cost SKD assembly in Nigeria and 
elsewhere, producing only for domestic demand and eschew South Africa where entry 
requirements are higher.  
So far it seems both groups have been partially correct. Exports have indeed dipped, 
reversing what had been a trend of growth. Likewise, the models to be assembled in Nigeria 
are quite often the same as those produced in South Africa, such as the Nissan NP300 LCV 
and the Ford Ranger LCV (Smyth, 2015; Ohuocha, 2015). However, in both cases the kits are 
being sourced from South Africa (Smyth, 2015; Ohuocha, 2015). There has also been the 
case of Peugeot deciding not to establish production of its 301 model in South Africa, citing a 
lack of demand for the investment required, while simultaneously building a SKD plant for 
the model in Nigeria supplied with kits from elsewhere (Cokayne, 2014d).  
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If South Africa is not a globally competitive production location then it is unlikely that the 
country will secure benefits from a Nigerian assembly industry, as kits and components will 
be sourced from elsewhere. Likewise, if Nigeria successfully advances to full domestic 
production it will likely have to have become a SSA production hub with extensive exports 
and in all likelihood will be producing a similar range of models for this market as South 
Africa. This could create intense competition with South African for investment in 
production by assemblers and component producers. However, if South Africa establishes a 
special relationship with Nigeria advantaging South African produced kits, South Africa 
could possibly outcompete more competitive kit production locations. A Nigerian kit 
assembly industry would then increase demand for South African production and the 
countries would not compete as directly for investment. This suggests that the most beneficial 
outcome for South African industry is to secure a special relationship with Nigeria and that it 
become trapped in low local value added SKD assembly. South Africa may well then be best 
off with a Nigerian worst case scenario, where value added outside of labour occurs in South 
Africa and Nigerian vehicle prices are high. An example of this relationship is Hyundai’s 
Nigeria operation. The firm assembles all vehicles for the Nigerian market fully in South 
Korea and then disassembles them to be ‘assembled’ once more in Nigeria. Without a special 
relationship with Nigeria it seems unlikely that firms would locate this kind of full production 
for kits in South Africa. Lower cost global production locations which already produce the 



















Chapter 5: Is SSA a viable automotive space?  
Whether SSA is a viable automotive space is then a fundamental question needing answering. 
A number of countries and firms seem to have bet that it is, while many others are waiting 
before acting. If it is then there is the possibility that this final frontier of automotive 
production will be a frontier no more. However, if all these automotive aspirations are in fact 
misplaced then the newly encouraged industry could well be an enormous waste of resources 
and will flounder.  
 
Sufficient Market  
An ‘automotive space’ is where there is a large enough market to justify large scale assembly. 
There are a number of ways for this to occur, it could be a large emerging market area 
(LEMA), on the periphery of such an area (PLEMA) or else where the domestic market is 
effectively expanded through trade agreements to create a larger regional market (Humphrey 
& Oeter, 2000). The two largest markets in SSA are Nigeria and South Africa and neither of 
these markets is large enough to sustain the scale of production required for a self-sustaining 
industry (Black & McLennan, 2015). Where plants need to produce at a scale of over 150 000 
units a year43 and components far beyond that, it is only through exports that South Africa is 
able to have a sustainable automotive industry (Abrenica, 1998). However, looking beyond 
South Africa and Nigeria the average market size for new and used, passenger vehicles and 
LCVs in the next 8 largest markets is  50 979 vehicles a year. This is comprised of such a 
plethora of vehicle models, makes and production years that without very high protection, 
assembly is not viable (Abrenica, 1998; Lester, 2015).         
 
While SSA is comprised of very small markets the combined market of the regions is actually 
quite large, at 1.84 million passenger vehicles a year and a not unsubstantial GDP of over 
$1.8 trillion (Black & McLennan, 2015). SSA as a whole has a population and passenger 
vehicle market equal to over 70% of India’s. However, SSA’s automotive production is equal 
to only a tiny 8.4% of India’s (OICA, 2015).44 India’s production is such that not only does it 
have truly indigenous brands such as Tata and Mahindra, which dominate the domestic 
market, but it is also a large automotive exporter. India had a total automotive trade surplus of 
$8.27 billion in 2013 from the exports of in passenger vehicles, commercial vehicles, buses, 
motorcycles and parts (DESA/UNSD, 2015). In contrast SSA is almost entirely import 
dependant, outside of South Africa, with each small individual market importing from global 
producers. This has meant that SSA had a trade deficit of $18.34 billion in 2013 for the same 
products that India has a trade surplus (DESA/UNSD, 2015). The simplicity of the 
comparison aside, the core reason for the difference is that India has a single market, with a 
high external tariff and restrictions on used vehicle imports. SSA’s fragmented markets have 
simply not allowed for a similar scale of vehicle production.   
 
Regionalisation Prospects  
Regional integration is a stated goal of almost all political entities in SSA. To this end there 
are an array of trade agreements and organisations that overlap. The five main ones are: the 
                                                          
43 See literature review 
44 See Table 1 in the introduction.  
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Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for East and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The 
agreements have created some degree of free trade between members with some going 
further than others. 45 Additionally in June 2015 the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) which 
is to link SADC, COMESA and EAC was officially launched (Deshmukh, 2015). This would 
be a powerful step to creating a large SSA free trade area. The most fundamental barrier to 
creating an integrated market for automotives in SSA is the costs of trade diversion (Black & 
McLennan, 2015: 22). These costs are particularly steep when national markets are mostly 
comprised of low cost, relatively high quality, used vehicle imports (Black & McLennan, 
2015: 22). At its core, the question is why would a country like Tanzania want to buy 
expensive Kenyan made vehicles rather than allowing imports of cheap, high quality 
Japanese used cars (Black & McLennan, 2015: 22)?  
 
This is exactly what regional organisations have been grappling with. Kenya, hoping to build 
on its current assembly industry and become the regional hub, managed to negotiate a 
common external tariff (CET) of 25% in the EAC for vehicles. This is a relatively large 
increase for some of the other members, given that Tanzania and Uganda have 0% tariffs on 
vehicle imports. Kenya also negotiated to get VAT in EAC countries calculated on the price 
of locally assembled vehicles at the factory exit and not after transport to the point of sale 
(Ligami, 2014).  However, the CET has so far come to nothing as the member nations were 
granted a stay on its implementation, meaning Kenyan assemblers continue to face 25% 
duties for Rwanda and Burundi and unconstrained competition in Tanzania and Uganda 
(Olingo, 2014). Kenyan assemblers also face bureaucratic hurdles, with the EAC requiring 
kits to be imported under the individual tariff lines of the components in the kits and a vague 
duty remission scheme (Olingo, 2014).  
 
ECOWAS established a CET in 2015 which sets passenger vehicle tariffs at up to 20% 
depending on the size of engine. Countries are then allowed to add an Import Adjustment Tax 
(IAT), which Nigeria promptly used to create its 70% duty on the imported vehicles. The IAT 
applies to all other ECOWAS nations and so ensures that auto assemblers would not establish 
a plant elsewhere in ECOWAS to access the Nigerian market. Other ECOWAS nations are 
also able to use IATs so as to restrict Nigerian assembler’s access to their markets. The 
uneven levels of protection have also meant that smuggling is expected to intensify between 
ECOWAS nations (Adeniyi, 2015).    
 
If SSA is to become a viable automotive space then it is vital that the necessary market exists. 
To this end regional integration can create a large and rapidly growing SSA market. The 
automotive industry could actually act as a driver for integration, if producers are able to put 
pressure on governments to increase regional market access and infrastructure integration 
(Lung & van Tulder, 2004). This will not occur if the countries with large domestic markets 
do the opposite and raise protection, so as to encourage the development of national 
automotive industries. It is then of vital importance that the attempts to create an automotive 
industry are agreed on as part of regional industrial policy. Otherwise, each nation may just 
                                                          
45 See Appendix G for the membership of various agreements.   
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be able to boast of domestic ‘screwdriver’ plants and high vehicle costs, as is currently the 
case in Ethiopia.   
   
Manufacturing Capabilities 
For there to be vehicle production in SSA there also needs to be competitive manufacturing 
capabilities. Unfortunately, African manufacturing firms operate in environments that have 
worse infrastructure, geography, access to credit as well higher tariffs, levels of political 
monopoly and corruption than similar income countries (Harrison, Lin & Xu, 2014). As such 
much of Africa suffers from high manufacturing costs. Cost can be direct such as capital, 
labour and electricity. Alternatively they are of an indirect or invisible nature, both of which 
arise from outside the actual manufacturing process (Iarossi, 2009). In Africa it is the indirect 
and invisible costs that are the major contributors to high manufacturing costs (Iarossi, 2009). 
African firms are found to have poorer performance than comparator nations in almost all 
performance outcomes: labour productivity, labour productivity growth, total factor 
productivity, sales growth, export share and investment intensity (Harrison, Lin & Xu, 2014).  
 
The operating environments lead to a number of specific costs that cause this poorer 
performance. Manufacturing wages in SSA are significantly higher than in Asian countries 
with comparable per capita incomes (Table 19). SSA firms face high interest rates on loans, 
with a less developed banking sector than in Asia. Electricity provision and cost varies 
widely across the region but in many cases is a substantial burden on manufacturing firms. 
High transport costs and difficult regulatory environments both make manufacturing more 
expensive than elsewhere (Ianossi, 2009). The largest costs for a manufacturing firm in SSA 
are the invisible ones. These are, amongst others: that high collateral is needed for loans and 
the costs from infrastructure failures and corruption. Examples of infrastructure failure 
incurred costs are the losses firms face when electricity supplies are intermittent or the cost of 
investing in private generation capabilities. South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana all have 
particularly severe electricity shortages and are some of the most industrialised economies in 
SSA (The Economist, 2014; Obulutsa, 2015; BBC, 2015b).  
   
Table 20: Wages in manufacturing, compared to GDP   
 Annual wages $ (2007) GDP per capita 2007 (real)* GDP per capita 2007 (current US$) 
South Africa  13 380 5 894 6 154 
Turkey 10 209 7 776 9 312 
Brazil 9 216 5121 7 194 
Morocco 7 263 2 116 2 416 
Malaysia 6 277 6 008 7 218 
Russia 6 042 6 311 9 146 
Tunisia 5 659 3 543 3 806 
Mauritius  5 022 5 580 6 286 
Kenya  2 905 565 848 
China  2 899 2 203 2 651 
India  2 352 864 1 069 
Malawi 1 885 225 266 
Tanzania 1 709 405 538 
Indonesia  1 667 1 389 1 871 
Lesotho 1 586 764 817 
Sri Lanka  1 529 1 400 1 614 
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Vietnam 1 339 784 919 
Ethiopia  1 090 190 245 
Source: UNIDO Statistics; World Development Indicators, World Bank; *at constant 2005 US$; Complied in 
Black & McLennan, 2015 
 
Ianossi (2009) found that invisible costs accounted for 13% of sales in Africa. This can be 
compared to less than 8% in South Asia and below 3% in East Asia (Ianossi, 2009). 
However, Harrison, Lin and Xu (2014), find that when infrastructure, access to finance and 
the political and business environment are all controlled for, African firms show a large 
conditional advantage in productivity, productivity growth and sales growth compared to 
similar income countries. This means that given a challenging environment African firms 
perform better than those in countries of a similar income, perhaps giving some hope to 
African manufacturing (Harrison, Lin & Xu, 2014: 59-74).  
 
There is no data on the cost of manufacturing in the automotive industry in SSA outside of 
South Africa. As such when looking at the automotive industry specifically it is necessary to 
use South Africa, even though it is very different from other SSA countries. Barnes et al. 
(2015) did a comparative study on the cost of production in South Africa and Thailand. 
Thailand is a low cost globally competitive automotive industry and the largest producer in 
the ASEAN bloc. On almost all indicators, Thailand had a substantial cost advantage over 
South Africa. It is noticeable that in the comparisons certain categories of labour have 
particularly high wage differentials. Although this could be partially attributable to different 
skill levels attached to the same job title in the different nations. Not only were wages 
considerably lower but firms in Thailand also had better scores on the productivity measures 
of quality, flexibility and inventory levels. The cost of logistics and utilities were also lower 
for firms in Thailand and South Africa has the most developed logistics and utilities 
infrastructure in SSA.  
    
Table 21: Labour and employment costs: South Africa and Thailand 
Employment 
category 
Avg. number of 
employees 
Median cost per 
employee in South 
Africa 
Median cost per 
employee in 
Thailand 




Management 18 R 428 500 R 158 148 2.7:1 
Professional 17 R 275 500 R 47 520 5.8:1 
Supervisors 44 R 122 000 R 29 946 4.1:1 
Artisan 40 R 267 000 R 22 080 12.1:1 
Production 613 R 53 334 R 19 320 2.8:1 
Apprentices 37 R 38 448 R 16 560 2.3:1 
 Total 769      
Source: Barnes et al. (2015) 
 
Suggested Policy 
Given all the facts laid out in the proceeding sections, that SSA does not have an automotive 
industry even a third the size of India’s could be seen as an indicator that the region lacks 
comparative advantage in the sector. In the vein of Lin’s arguments, (Lin and Chang, 2009), 
if there were opportunities to be had for large scale production then firms would surely have 
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taken advantage of them. However, automotive industries have never emerged without policy 
intervention and SSA would be no different. What policies countries in SSA and the region as 
a whole choose to introduce, so as to encourage an automotive industry, will be the core 
reason for its success or failure.    
Protection Requirement   
With huge inflows of used vehicles, some of which are of good quality and low price, from 
Western Europe and Japan into SSA, no industry will be able to take off without protection. 
This is not unique to SSA. Automotive industries have never developed without tariff 
protection, as it is impossible for them to compete with used vehicles from the outset. Used 
vehicle imports prices are artificially low, due to market distorting policies encouraging local 
consumption or environmental protection as outlined earlier in this paper. Unprotected firms 
will never make the necessary investments to create a sustainable, competitive industry. In 
countries such as South Africa, Thailand and Brazil the industry still receives protection long 
after establishment (UNCTAD, 2015).  Erwin and Lester both decry used car imports, not 
only as they price out local assembly, but also since they create an enormous array of makes 
and models in the market. This makes it very difficult for any local component manufacturers 
to produce at scale for the aftermarket, as there is no consolidated parts market beyond the 
most basic common components.  
 
It is then vital for any country looking to establish an automotive industry in SSA to control 
the imports of used vehicles. Even with legislation in place actually controlling these imports 
is difficult, for example when Nigeria limited imports to vehicles not older than seven years 
banned vehicles were simply smuggled in (Beuving, 2004). Through increased policing it 
may be possible that even if smugglers can bribe their way past customs the increased costs 
of transporting the vehicles surreptitiously and bribes actually become an import barrier for 
vehicles.  
Encouraging a Commitment to CKD 
As discussed in previous sections the automotive industry is highly scale intensive, for both 
assembly and component manufacture. When a small market establishes protection it is 
unlikely to reach the required levels of scale to operate efficiently. The incentives created for 
firms by high levels of protection are to assemble many models, maximising consumer 
choice, while minimising their capital expenditure. This is exactly the opposite of what a 
components sector requires to grow, which is production consolidated into a few models with 
large scale production runs. As argued by Black (2007) low volume production creates 
greater external diseconomies to the production process than internal to it and so assemblers 
pursue the strategy that is most adverse to components firms.  
This is exactly what has been occurring in Nigeria and Ethiopia with their protectionist 
policies. Large numbers of plants assembling a wide array of makes and models are 
emerging. Unfortunately this has meant that the plants are focused on SKD assembly and do 
not have the capacities to assemble using anything but the most basic locally produced 
components. The local component manufacturing sector is then locked into producing 
products that are common in all vehicles and require minimal technological capabilities to 
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include in the assembly process. These components are limited to the likes of tyres, batteries, 
springs, radiators, brake pads, cables, rubber and plastic components.     
 
A possible reason to pursue this industry development route is that investment in SKD 
assembly is viewed as part of the gradual plan to introduce the industry. The tariffs force 
investment which is then expected to be slowly ratcheted up and more value added locally. 
SKD is allowed as firms are initially unwilling to commit to any major investments since 
they do not know if protection will remain, the countries technological capabilities in the 
automotive industry or how the domestic market will respond to import restrictions. 
Certainly, in a nation like Nigeria firms will be waiting to see if smuggling can be controlled 
and the government can resist pressure from the public and port operators to reduce tariffs.           
 
The difficulty with this strategy is how to drive the incremental investment and production 
increases it requires. The initial investments in SKD plants do not lay a foundation for CKD 
assembly and then full manufacturing, but are completely different production process. There 
is then no natural driver that encourages firms to move beyond their SKD assembly, any 
transition is reliant on industrial policy measures. A larger market with these polices simply 
encourages investment in plants with larger SKD assembly capacities but not CKD assembly. 
In Nigeria, optimistic market estimates have meant that there are already initial investments 
in relatively large capacity SKD plants, such as Stallion Group’s 45 000 unit a year plant 
(Abioye, 2013).  
 
If the government seeks to enforce a transition to CKD assembly, so as to create assembly 
processes which local component firms can supply, the multitude of firms involved in SKD 
assembly will resist its efforts. Pressure will come from both from foreign and local investors 
who do not wish to lose the investments they have made and re-invest in a fundamentally 
new process, their plants often needing to be redesigned and refurbished. Foreign investors 
tend to partner with politically connected business groups, which have the capital and 
capabilities to engage in vehicle distribution and/or assembly. Local partners who meet these 
requirements are usually some of the most powerful business groups in the country, as has 
been the case in Nigeria and Ethiopia. Foreign investors, local firms and labour involved in 
SKD assembly may together have enough political clout to stall any rationalisation process 
and hold countries in SSA indefinitely in SKD assembly.         
   
Rather than pursuing the current extreme effective rates of protection, countries should rather 
attempt to pursue a medium tariff level. Industry insiders suggest that a tariff level of 35% is 
enough for a market to be investment worthy, as long as the import of used vehicles is also 
controlled. This should be partnered with low level tariffs on imported components, so as to 
provide reasonable effective rates of protection. The aim would be to attract a relatively small 
number of reasonably large investments in CKD assembly from the start, with SKD assembly 
as heavily penalised as FBU imports. The few CKD operations could then be more easily 
concentrated in special economic zones (SEZs) and benefit from clustering and a more 
conducive business environment. Investors would seek to localise component production 
from the outset and could encourage members of their global production networks to follow 
them into the market. As efficiencies improve with time and a growing market so more 
components would be localised and the industry could become sustainable.     
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Special Economic Zone 
As the manufacturing costs in SSA are mainly a result of factors outside the control of firms, 
it is up to countries to improve this. If they are able to, then costs could drop radically. As 
Harrison, Lin and Xu (2014) confirm, firms in Africa are actually highly productive, it is the 
environments they operate in that make them less competitive than comparator country firms. 
Massive projects to provide power and transport infrastructure as well as drives for legislative 
streamlining are all occurring in SSA. Although this is not an issue which can be solved 
overnight, it is certainly something that is recognised as needing to be addressed (Aryeetey & 
Moyo, 2012).  
 
In the short term, these issues can possibly be tackled with special economic zones, with 
specially provided infrastructure and legislative rules. SEZs are useful as an entire country 
does not need to become globally competitive in a sector or attract FDI, rather a targeted area 
within that country can be developed (Watson, 2001: 15). SEZs can be granted favoured 
treatment with respect to taxation, infrastructure, import controls and industrial regulations 
(Jayanthakumaran, 2003: 52). Additionally bureaucratic procedures for SEZs are streamlined. 
For example in Turkey it takes on average half the time to get a telephone connection, 
electricity connection, water connection or construction permit in a SEZ than in a non-SEZ 
area (World Bank, 2010:21-22).   
 
This makes development objectives become more achievable by focusing on a single 
geographic region. For example, a country as a whole may have no logistics industry to speak 
of and be unable to change this at any great pace, but within the SEZ, the country can focus 
resources and construct world class logistics infrastructure. Countries can use SEZs to focus 
on any elements of the prevailing business environment that would constrain component and 
assembly firms, such as electricity provision and customs controls (Watson, 2001: 15). This 
has been a highly successful approach in Asia where these ‘incubators of policy’ were 
supplied world class infrastructure and reduced red tape which enabled them to become 
engines of growth (World Bank, 2008).   
Regional Integration46 
In SSA, outside South Africa, the individual markets are unlikely to be large enough to attract 
CKD investment without severely limiting consumer choice. Possibly Nigeria could be an 
exception, so long as the country continues to experience rapid economic growth and their 
automotive policy is dynamic and responsive to the investment they have attracted so far. 
However, for all other countries their markets are simply too small, as noted in earlier 
sections. While current steps towards integration has not progressed as quickly as was hoped, 
significant potential exists.       
 
Barnes argues strongly for a SSA regional policy for automotive production. This is 
something that needs to be driven, but not totally dominated, by the only existing producer 
South Africa. Barnes does not see any other SSA country able to create anything close to a 
fully functional automotive industry without a regional policy. As demand is unleashed in the 
                                                          
46 This section draws on an interview with Professor Justin Barnes, Chairman of B&M Analysts.    
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region, countries need to be discouraged from each pursuing individualistic industrial policies 
for the automotive industry. This will necessarily require countries, especially South Africa, 
to not attempt to seize all the gains from increased new vehicle demand. Through co-
ordination regional production and localisation can be maximised but for countries to submit 
to this they will need to feel their individual gains are not diminished. 
 
A crucial element of this is that South Africa cannot think that it can either survive without 
the region or bully the region into a one sided agreement. Barnes stresses that localisation of 
production cannot increase in South Africa without an associated increase in production and 
South Africa’s domestic market is quite simply not big enough to provide it. Problematically 
Asian labour is more productive than South African labour and so South Africa’s share of 
global production has been shrinking. This leaves South Africa in a perilous situation and 
only just able to remain as a tier three producer, a single level above kit assembly.  
 
Fortunately there is a real opportunity for growth and that is in the SSA market. A protected 
regional market which manages to boost South African production to 1.2 million vehicles a 
year would add at least 100 000 jobs. With a considered regional automotive industrial plan, 
much like ASEAN, these jobs and future ones could be shared amongst the countries in the 
region. A key difference between ASEAN and SSA is that South Africa is a regional 
hegemon with a well-developed industry and technological capabilities while the region lags 
behind, in ASEAN the countries are more similar.  
The Motorcycle Alternative 
The relatively small current market for passenger vehicles raises doubts about attempting to 
jump to fostering vehicle assembly in SSA. A possible alternative strategy is to first focus on 
motorcycle production before moving to automotives. This is a strategy that has been used in 
a number of Asian countries, where motorcycle industries also stimulated general 
industrialisation (Ohara & Sato, 2008: 11&12). The core technology for the commercial 
‘workhorse’ motorcycles which dominate the market in developing nations has not advanced 
since Honda released the ‘Super Cub’ in 1958  (Ohara & Sato, 2008: 4).  This means the 
production technology is mature and accessible to a developing world producer (Ohara & 
Sato, 2008: 4). Additionally production of these bikes is simpler than cars and they are 
composed of only 10% of the parts needed for a passenger vehicle (Ohara & Sato, 2008: 
3&4).  Motorcycles with their comparatively lower levels of technological complexity and 
large domestic markets are then more attractive for less industrialised nations to produce than 
passenger vehicles (Ohara & Sato, 2008: 3). Unlike in light vehicles, individual SSA 
countries have large motorcycle markets, which would allow high levels of localisation and 








Chapter 6: Conclusion  
SSA is experiencing huge growth in demand for light vehicles. This is unlikely to abate as 
projections suggest a rapidly expanding middle class. However, growth in vehicle demand is 
almost entirely concentrated in used vehicles from the developed world. Conversely growth 
in new vehicle imports from Triad exporters is almost stagnant and even generous estimates 
of total new vehicle demand are still very small. With unconstrained imports of cheap used 
vehicles, an automotive industry will never be able to emerge in SSA, outside of the existing 
protected industry in South Africa.  
 
Growing used vehicle imports represent an increasing burden on countries in SSA’s current 
accounts, as they deepen countries’ automotive trade deficits. A number of countries in SSA 
have indicated that they wish to change this by instead locally assembling vehicles. These 
countries also view establishing an automotive industry as a means to increase 
industrialisation and employment levels. Quite correctly these countries realise that there can 
be no domestic industry in a country which allows the free import of FBU used vehicles. As 
such a tariff policy targeting used vehicles or an outright ban are necessary steps for any 
domestic production and have been implemented. Unfortunately these tariff policies have 
been designed to create the lowest barrier and biggest incentive to invest rather than targeting 
quality investment. As such they have only managed to raise vehicle prices and attract 
subsidised SKD assembly which adds no real value to the economy.  
 
As it stands attempting to foster an automotive industry using their current policy framework 
could quite well end in ruinous costs to government and very limited benefits, other than for 
the protected assemblers. This is of course not desirable at all. There are a number of policy 
options which could improve the viability of SSA, or individual countries within it, as an 
automotive space. The most fundamental of these is a programme creating an integrated 
regional market and a regional automotive development policy. The possibilities here are 
most clearly shown by India, which has a comparable population and GDP to SSA but a large 
automotive trade surplus and high levels of domestic automotive employment.  
 
Any regional automotive strategy needs to be embraced equally by both the hegemon, South 
Africa, and the region in general. This is only possible with an equitable sharing of the costs 
and benefits that a regional industry would bring. South Africa has technological capabilities 
in automotive production but cannot grow further through domestic consumption and is 
struggling to compete globally. Other countries in SSA have exploding demand but next to 
no technological capabilities in the industry. This presents a possible mutually beneficial 
avenue of a regionally integrated industry. Countries in SSA could create a joint automotive 
market and strategy with South Africa in exchange for assistance in the development of an 
interlinked regional industry. 
 
If a regional plan is developed or countries try to develop industries in isolation they need to 
attract the kind of investment that actually establishes the foundation for a sustainable 
industry to grow on. Otherwise they will be faced with an infant industry that won’t grow up, 
continually requiring extensive support. To achieve this it is best to attract fewer larger 
investments than a multitude of low value ones. Specifically rather than encouraging low 
value added SKD assembly to be established, in the hope firms will invest more thoroughly 
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and create CKD assembly at a future date, CKD investment attraction should be the goal 
from the start. This requires more active courting of OEMs and a tariff structure that 
penalises SKD and FBU imports equally. As the industrial capabilities in much of SSA are 
limited by factors outside of a firm’s control, states will need to alleviate these constraints for 
a large scale intimal investment to be secured. The best way for countries to do this is to 
create SEZs where they can concentrate their resources. In this way external barriers to 
automotive production, such as secure electricity supply and a logistics industry, can be 
resolved at a localised level. SEZs also encourage clustering and its ancillary benefits which 
in turn further encourages firms to invest in the country.  
 
Unfortunately these policies are not simple to implement, both due to powerful invested 
interest groups who would not support them and the difficulties inherent in the 
implementation of complex industrial policy. As such the viability of SSA as an automotive 
space is anything but certain. It would then possibly be more in the interest of countries in the 
region to aim slightly lower and foster motorcycle production industries. There is already 
truly gigantic demand for these in many countries in SSA. These domestic markets would be 
sure to incentivise investment. Additionally motorcycle technology is more mature and less 
complex than that of automotive, making low industrial capabilities less of a barrier. 
Motorcycles can also then be used as a positive stepping stone to value added automotive 
assembly. Motorcycle production would raise the industrial capabilities of a country so that 
when they do attempt automotive assembly they do not need to stoop to SKD assembly to 
attract investment.    
 
It is far from certain that an automotive industry can be successfully established in SSA, or 
any countries within it, at this point. However, if done carefully it is also far from certain that 
it would fail. The surest approach is for individual countries to aim lower and first attract 
motorcycle production and then, once that is established, encourage automotive production as 
well. This is not the only option and if SSA as a region is able to create a common market 
and mutually beneficial strategy then, much like India, a powerful industry could well 
emerge. No matter what it will require careful thought and dynamic policy decisions for SSA 


















Appendix A: List of Persons Interviewed 
Name Date of Interview Title  
Alec Erwin 8 April 2015 Former South African 
Minister for Trade and 
Industry, and Minster of 
Public Enterprises 
Director of  UBU Investment 
Holdings and consultant on 
the Nigerian automotive 
policy 
Justin Barnes 3 September 2015 Chairman B&M Analysts 
Chair of Industrial Studies, 
Adjunct Associate Professor 
at School of Development 
Studies, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Craig Parker 22 May 2015 Senior Economic Consultant, 
Frost & Sullivan 












Appendix B: Data Challenges of UN Comtrade  
The most problematic element of UN Comtrade data is that the database does not consistently 
take into account the flows of cars out of the Middle East, with patchy or just absent data. 
Tracking these flows is important as anecdotally they are viewed to be very large when 
talking to those involved in the SSA vehicle trade. In the years of UN Comtrade data that 
they are reported in, exports are indeed quite significant. For example Oman only has data for 
2001 available and in that year it is the largest exporter to SSA by a long way, with huge 
exports to the former Sudan. However, even excluding Sudan it is second only to the whole 
EU. Likewise when the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia do supply data they are 
amongst the top exporters (DESA/UNSD, 2015).  
 
Even when UN Comtrade data is available there are some other issues. One is the possibility 
that double counting exists if the exports from non-producing SSA nations are included. This 
occurs where cars have been imported to a nation due to its good ports or low duties and then 
are counted as exports of that nation to its neighbours. As such these entries have dropped, 
possibly leading to an under representation of trade. There are also a few nonsensical entries 
in the UN Comtrade data, most notably; entries showing all of SACU registering impossibly 
high imports from South Africa in 2010 when South Africa changed its reporting methods.47 
These are adjusted so as to instead be representative of the trends in the data.  
 
Data from sub-Saharan African countries is rife with these kinds of errors, with missing 
entries or unbelievable numbers. As such rather than relying on the countries themselves to 
track their imports mirror data from exporters was instead used. The only exception to this 











                                                          
47 It is highly unlikely that Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland each imported in (000’s) 3 212; 242; 
1785 and 985 passenger cars respectively in 2010 and then 8.9; 3.3; 15.7 and 3.1 in 2011. Especially since if 
viewed as percentages of their populations the 2010 imports represent 160% of Botswana getting cars, 12% of 
Lesotho, 82% of Namibia and 83% of Swaziland. More likely this is an error due to South Africa not reporting 
SACU members in its trade reporting until 2010. 
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Appendix C: Passenger vehicle and LCV HS Codes  
Passenger Car Definitions 
The categories included in the Harmonised System (HS) code 8703,  ‘motor cars and other 
motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons’, were used to define 
passenger vehicles for the trade data. The data was accessed at the six digit level for UN 
Comtrade, so as to exclude non-passenger car vehicles used for carrying people, and the 8-10 
digit level for the US, EU and Japanese sources to be able to specify used and new passenger 
vehicles.   
 
For UN Comtrade database the following HS codes were included:  
870321; 870322; 870323; 870324; 870331; 870332; 870333 and 870390  
 
For the Eurostat Comext Database the following HS codes were included 
New passenger vehicles: 87032110; 87032210; 87032211; 87032219; 87032311; 87032319; 
87032410; 87033110; 87033211; 87033219; 87033311 and 87033319 
Used passenger vehicles: 87032190; 87032290; 87032390; 87032490; 87033190; 87033290 
and 87033390 
 
For the Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau database the following HS codes were included 
New passenger vehicles: 870321919; 870321929; 870322920; 870323919; 870323929; 
870324920; 870331900; 870331920; 870332919; 870332929; 870333920 and 870390900 
Used passenger vehicles: 870310000; 870321910; 870321915; 870321920; 870321925; 
870322900; 870322910; 870323910; 870323915; 870323920; 870323925; 870324900; 
870324910; 870331910; 870332910; 870332915; 870332920; 870332925; 870333900; 
870333910; 870390000 and 870390100 
 
For the US International Trade Commission database the following HS codes were included 
New passenger vehicles: 8703330030; 8703330010; 8703240030; 8703230010; 8703900000; 
8703330045; 8703320010; 8703310000; 8703240075; 8703240060; 8703240050; 
8703240010; 8703230075; 8703230060; 8703230020; 8703220000 and 8703210000 
Used passenger vehicles: 8703230090; 8703240090; 8703320050 and 8703330085 
LCV Definitions  
LCV are not recorded separately and are drawn from the category defined as ‘motor vehicles 
for the transport of goods’. This is done imperfectly by assuming that all vehicles in the 
category with a weight of less than 5 tons are LCVs. The largest exporters into Africa do not 
record new and used LCVs separately. This meant that the data was drawn from the UN 
Comtrade data, accessible at 6 digits under the HS, as the nation’s individual data bases did 
not provide any additional information.   
For UN Comtrade database the following HS codes were used to define LCVs:  





Appendix D: Countries Classified by Area According to AfDB 
There are differing views as to which countries constitute the various regions of African. For 
the purposes of this paper the African Development Bank’s definitions of North, East, 
Southern, Central and West Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is then an amalgamation of these less 
North Africa. The countries included in each region are as follows:  
North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.  
East Africa: Comoros, Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda 
Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
Central Africa: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Madagascar 
West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 



















Appendix E: China Chongqing Big Science and Technology Development 
Group CKD Assembly Process   





Appendix F: Popular Accounts of African ‘Henry Fords’  
Nigeria - IVM 
IVM is the latest and most ambitious project of Innocent Chukuwuma a very well connected 
Igbo businessman. His elder brother Gabriel Chukwuma, a business mogul in his own right, 
facilitated Innocent’s entry into the Nnewi spare parts cluster through an apprenticeship with 
one Romanus Eze Onwuka. Romanus was Nnewi’s largest importer of motorcycle spare parts 
in 1978, at the cluster’s peak (Vanguard, 2014).  With financial assistance from his brother 
Innocent used the skills he had acquired apprenticing with Romanus and established Innoson 
Nigeria Ltd. in 1981 to import motorcycle and vehicle parts from Taiwan (Vanguard, 2014). 
At the time Nigerian firms only imported Japanese FBU motorcycles both new and used 
(Ufford, 2014).48 The Naira depreciated steeply in the late 1980s and 1990s which increased 
the cost of motorcycle imports, slowing demand for spares. Part of the cost issue was that 
each 40ft container of FBU motorcycles from Japan contained only 40 motorcycles 
(Vanguard, 2014). In an attempt to increase imports Innocent made connections with the low 
cost Chinese producers Jingcehng and Jiachi, who produced copies of popular Japanese 
brands, and got them to break down the motorcycles before shipping (Vanguard, 2014; 
Ufford, 2014). The motorcycles were then manually recoupled in Nigeria, allowing 200 to be 
packed into each container (Ufford, 2014). The combined factors of low cost suppliers and 
lower transport costs meant that Innoson was able to sell new motorcycles at around 50% of 
the value of other new imports into Nigeria (Vanguard, 2014; Ufford, 2014).  
 
In the 1990se used Japanese motorcycles, known for their quality and relatively low price, 
truly dominated the Nigerian market and Innoson made some inroads into this market 
dominance with its lower cost Chinese knockoffs (Ufford, 2014). The firm was able to sell up 
to 40 000 motorcycles a month at its peak (Vanguard, 2014). Quickly competition appeared 
as others started to assemble broken down bikes instead of importing FBU motorcycles and 
shifted to lower cost producers. In response Innocent along with his Igbo backers bought 
Eastern Plastics a state owned plastics firm located 110 km from Innoson’s motorcycle plant 
(Vanguard, 2014). It was renamed the Innoson Technical and Industries Company Ltd. and 
refitted with modern machinery to produce the plastics for motorcycles (Aziken, 2014).49 
Producing plastic parts domestically from 2002 allowed Innoson to import 250 motorcycles 
per container and sell them at below 66% of the cost of a used bike (Vanguard, 2014). This 
effectively wiped out the second hand motorcycle market (Vanguard, 2014; Abone, 2014; 
Ufford, 2014).  
 
Success was short lived as increased social pressure to restrict motorcycle numbers in cities 
and ever cheaper imports from India and China reduced demand for Innoson motorcycles. 
Innocent’s response has been to expand into Innoson into rubber products and vehicle 
assembly (Vanguard, 2014). IVM, the Innoson group’s automotive arm, was founded in 
2007, also in Nnewi, and assembly started in 2010 when its factory was opened by then 
president Goodluck Jonathan (Emmanuel, 2014). It has quickly increased its product line 
from only assembling buses and pick-up trucks so that in 2014 IVM was assembling 13 
                                                          
48 The brands were Honda, Suzuki and Yamaha (Ufford, 2014).  
49 The plant has succeeded outside of motorcycle parts, as its capacity was underutilised just for motorcycles 
other products were added. In 2014 it was producing up to 150 plastics products for variant applications and is 
an example of ancillary industrialisation (Vanguard, 2014; Aziken, 2014).  
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different vehicles including SUVs, sedans, buses and dump trucks (Aziken, 2014). Assembly 
is asserted to be of a CKD nature from spare parts imported from China, with Chinese 
workers supervising assembly in Nigeria and training the Nigerian technicians (Abone, 
2014). Innocent claims that local content exists at up to 60% in Innoson vehicles, which can 
only be a massive exaggeration, also throwing doubt on his other claims. However, IVM does 
use the Nnewi cluster to supply parts along with his other firms in the region (Abone, 2014; 
Ufford, 2014; Emmanuel, 2014; Vanguard, 2014). The Nigerian manufactured components 
claimed to be supplied include: cabling, lubricants, plastics, batteries, exhausts, upholstery, 
polymer products, light fittings, tyres and rubber materials (Emmanuel, 2014; Aziken, 2014; 
Dominic, 2015). 
 
 IVM has increased factory capacity twice since its opening in 2010 and now is able to 
assemble up to 10 000 vehicles a year (Emmanuel, 2014). The firm uses labour intensive 
practises, such as replacing all automated conveyers with trollies that are pushed from station 
to station. Innocent embraces labour intensive practises as a way to keep capital and other 
costs down. He claims the factory is employing over 7 000 people and is not yet functioning 
at capacity, this again seems like an exceptionally high number (Emmanuel, 2014; Ufford, 
2014; Abone, 2014). The brand has seen reasonable success, supplying 6 000 buses to the 
Nigerian government as well as rapidly selling their 500 vehicle initial offering (Obiukwu, 
2014; Mordi, 2015). They claim to have started to export vehicles to Ghana, Benin, Gambia, 
Sierre Leone and other African nations, although the numbers must struggle to reach double 
digits for these exports (Dominic, 2015). The entry level passenger vehicle retails at 1 million 
Naira which is a little over $5 000, making it exceptionally cheap and more affordable than 
all other new Nigerian vehicles50 (Mordi, 2015). Alongside IVM, Innocent and other 
investors established General Tyres & Tubes Ltd. in Enugu. The goal is to produce at 
volumes capable of supplying all of Nigeria’s tire and tube market, the factory is now 
complete but is currently still in trial production stages (Obiukwu, 2014). Innoson has also 
established an automotive training school in Nnewi to enable further expansion as well as a 
network of aftermarket support centres for its vehicles, which would be a first for Nigeria 
(Emmanuel, 2014).    
 
Ghana – Kantanka  
Kantanka Automobile Company Ltd. is the product of ASSTRC an institute owned by a 
maverick Ghanaian inventor Apostle Kwawo Safo. Over many years he has claimed to have 
invented a myriad of devices including: clap on clap off televisions, engineless battery 
powered cars, plastic moulding machines, rocket launchers, excavators, electronic billboards, 
voltage stabilisers and many, many others fostering great pride amongst the Ghanaians51 
(Buabeng, 2014; Africa Redemption Magazine, 2013). In 1996 at the 19th addition the annual 
show where he displayed his products Safo displayed an engine block he had cast, this was 
                                                          
50 The Nissan and Hyundai passenger car being assembled in Nigeria sell for between 1.5 and 1.9 million Naira 
(The Nation, 2014).  
51 There is a rather fervent personality cult about Safo. A magazine describes him as “… the world’s greatest 
multi-dimentional scientist and technologist of all times and has carried out the greatest philanthropic activity in 
Ghana.” They go on to list amongst his qualities that his is “[the] Most mysterious man on earth. It is practically 
impossible to comprehend his level of wisdom.” There are also claims he can perform miracles such as 
“…healing the sick; raising the dead; commanding the ground to split open for water and Tilapia to emerge and 
form a fish pond” (Africa Redemption Magazine, 2014).  
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the first sign of his automotive aspirations (Buabeng, 2014). By 1998 he displayed a five 
seater sedan which he claimed was powered with his previously developed engine and named 
it the Kantanka Saloon and so Kantanka Automobile Company Ltd. (KAC) was born 
(Buabeng, 2014). In 2006 the Kantanka Onantefo I was revealed, it was a 4-wheel drive 
sedan (Buabeng, 2014). In 2007 it was upgraded to the Kantanka Onantefo II and the 
Kantanka Obrempong I a stretch limousine was also displayed (Buabeng, 2014). Producing a 
plethora of models the firm showcased a total of 12 different models between 1998 and 2013 
(Buabeng, 2014). However, production was at the infinitesimal rate of 2 vehicles a year 
meaning they were only really for display purposes and to create hype about the media savvy 
Safo (Buabeng, 2014; Owusu, 2015).  
 
This changed in early 2014 when Safo claimed to have secured an investment from an 
unnamed Chinese firm. This would allow KAC to create an assembly plant which could 
produce Kantanka vehicles at a commercial volume by 2015 (Owusu, 2015). The assembly 
plant currently claims capacity to produce 8 vehicles a day, 4 SUVs and 4 LCVs, but can be 
upgraded to 20 vehicles per day (Yeboah, 2015). The plant is a step away from artisanal 
production to instead claim to do CKD assembly of Chinese products (Yeboah, 2015). Safo 
describes that the plant’s assembly process involves: welding; a chemical treatment against 
corrosion; painting, at the in house paint shop where the parts are washed, sprayed and baked; 
it is then assembled and finally tested for faults (Yeboah, 2015). Assembly is done by over 
200 workers most of whom have no formal education. There has been much media hype 
about the vehicles with celebrities, Al Jazeera and others all punting the vehicles and 
domestic Ghanaian media houses relentlessly promoting them (Mensah, 2014; Africa 
Redemption Magazine, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Owusu, 2015; BBC, 2015a). However, the 
price is as yet unknown, they are not available for public purchase and there have also been 
criticisms that Safo’s projects are just re-engineering imported vehicles (Nyavor, 2014; 
Owusu, 2015). Safo has been successful in painting his detractors as ‘un-African’ or 
‘unpatriotic’ and his vehicles as inventions of Ghana, produced in the nation, despite the fact 
that they are really assembled Chinese parts. Safo certainly sees a grander mission with his 
‘Ghanaian’ vehicles describing his mission as: “God called me to show blacks that we have 
natural resources; so why are we poor?” (Yeboah, 2015).  
Mozambique – Matchedje 
In Southern Africa, the only indigenous brand making media waves is a rebadging operation 
in Mozambique. It is called Matchedje Motors and it is the result of an investment by China 
Tong Jian Investment Company. There are some incredible claims associated with the firm 
including that they have installed capacity of 30 000 units per annum and by 2020 they will 
produce 500 000 vehicles a year, which seems quite frankly impossible (Gasnier, 2015). 
However, the reported investment is large, $150 million if the reports are to be believed, and 
around 1 000 vehicles can be assembled a year with the goal to increase this to 30 000 ‘in the 
next few years’ (O Pais, 2014). The only model currently assembled is a Foday Lion F16, 






Appendix G: Membership of key African Regional Economic Communities 
Country SACU SADC EAC COMESA ECOWAS 
Angola  x    
Benin     x 
Botswana x x    
Burkina Faso     x 
Burundi   X x  
Cape Verde     x 
Comoros    x  
Cote d’Ivoire     x 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
 x  x  
Djibouti    x  
Egypt    x  
Eritrea    x  
Ethiopia    x  
Gambia      x 
Ghana     x 
Guinea     x 
Guinea-Bissau     x 
Kenya   X x  
Lesotho x x    
Liberia     x 
Libya    x  
Madagascar  x  x  
Malawi  x  x  
Mali     x 
Mauritius  x  x  
Mozambique  x    
Namibia x x    
Niger     x 
Nigeria      x 
Rwanda   X x  
Senegal     x 
Sierra Leone     x 
Sudan    x  
Seychelles  x  x  
South Africa x x    
Swaziland x x  x  
Tanzania  x X   
Togo     x 
Uganda   X x  
Zambia  x  x  
Zimbabwe  x  x  
Note: The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) comprising South Africa and its small neighboring 
countries economies is not listed above.  
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